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CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
DOUGLASS CASSEL, JR.*
More than most lawsuits, school desegregation cases touch basic
economic interests and deep-seated psychic sensitivities of entire com-
munities. In this context, legal notions of the "intent" of governmental
bodies and the "effect" of their actions on massive, intricate social processes
seem eerily abstract. Though limited and necessarily artificial, these legal
concepts are nonetheless the jurisprudential links by which courts must
legitimize their efforts to define "rights" worthy of recognition in deseg-
regating schools in large urban areas.
This article focuses primarily on this term's decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit involving desegregation of the
Milwaukee and Indianapolis public schools.I It also briefly reviews the
court's decisions this term involving employment discrimination on the basis
of race, sex or age, 2 and first amendment freedoms. 3 Related topics which are
discussed include the standards of review and the requisites of "state action"
in equal protection cases, 4 and federal court deference to state judicial or
administrative proceedings which threaten freedom of expression. 5 This
term's decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in other areas
of civil rights and civil liberties law are catalogued, without comment, in the
accompanying footnote. 6
* Staff attorney, Business and Professional People for the Public Interest; member of the
Illinois, Maryland and District of Columbia Bars; J.D., Harvard Law School. Views expressed
are purely personal. The author is indebted to Mr. Daniel W. Bates, Capitol University Law
School, class of 1977, for extensive research assistance.
1. See text accompanying notes 7-156 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 157-236 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 237-284 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 158-165 infra (standards of review); text accompanying
notes 222-230 infra (state action).
5. See text accompanying notes 272-284 infra.
6. The following is a non-exhaustive list of the civil rights and civil liberties decisions of
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit this term involving procedural due process; housing;
voting and elections; prisoners' rights; equal protection; jurisdiction, standing, comity, attor-
neys' fees and immunity in civil rights cases; and the right of privacy.
Procedural due process: Confederation of Police v. Chicago, 529 F.2d 89 (7th Cir.) (demotions
and other adverse employment actions taken against police officers affect property interests and
must be preceded by procedures conforming with due process, perhaps requiring collective
bargaining as a "necessary adjunct"), vacated and remanded, 96 S. Ct. 3186 (1976); Stebbins v.
Weaver, 537 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1976) (no procedural due process required before denying plaintiff
tenure, because he had no affected interest in property or liberty, even though when hired he was
given some expectation of tenure), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1977) (No.
76-609); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976) (due process requires uniform standards
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for determining eligibility for welfare benefits); Martin-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33 (7th
Cir. 1976) (due process not violated by combining investigative and adjudicative functions in
committee rejecting plaintiff's bar application, or by placing burden in such proceeding on
applicant; equal protection does not require same procedures for bar applicant as for attorneys in
disciplinary proceedings); Hill v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 537 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1976) (due process
does not require hearing before assigning plaintiff failing grades due to alleged plagiarism, where
no further disciplinary action would be taken without notice and hearing); Fern v. Thorp Pub.
School, 532 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff waived substantive due process claim against
dismissal without prior warning for teaching of controversial sex education materials, where he
failed to accept hearing offered by defendants); Castanada-Delgado v. Immigration Serv., 525
F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1976) (denial of continuance in deportation case, which denied parties
sufficient time to obtain counsel, denied Mexican-American plaintiffs procedural due process);
Wroblaski v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1976) (dismissal of immigration officer for violation
of agency regulation by employing aliens did not offend due process); Lambert v. Conrad, 536
F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1976) (damages action for termination without due process hearing barred by
res judicata because of dismissal of prior action for injunctive relief on same claim); Anastasia v.
Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975) (no due process notice or
hearing required before hotel seizes guest's property for nonpayment of rent, because no state
action involved), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1143 (1976); Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1975)
(due process requires advance notice of reasons for reduction in food stamp benefits), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1484 (1976).
Housing: Wang v. Lake Maxinhall Estates, Inc., 531 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1976) (evidence justified
inference of racial discrimination from lot-owners committee's refusal to sell property to person
of Oriental descent); Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975)
(HUD's limited consideration of social and other environmental impact of scattered-site,
low-income housing, and its decision not to file full Environmental Impact Statement, did not
violate National Environmental Policy Act or HUD regulations), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1462
(1976).
Voting and Elections: Baum v. Lunding, 535 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1976) (first-come, first-serve
ballot position does not deny later-filing candidate equal protection); Russo v. Vacin, 528 F.2d 27
(7th Cir. 1976) (no claim stated by complaint alleging political gerrymandering of aldermanic ward
lines, where no allegations of disproportionate population or indicia of invidious discrimination);
Kendrick v. Walder, 527 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1975) (complaint alleging that at-large city elections
discriminate against blacks by minimizing and cancelling out their voting strength as a group,
precluding election of blacks to city council, states claim under fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments); Flory v. FCC, 528 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1975) (communist party candidate, who
declared that he would run as write-in candidate if he did not obtain the necessary signatures to be
on ballot, was entitled to "equal time" under FCC regulation); Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861
(7th Cir. 1975) (no claim proved where voting machines malfunctioned and some voters allowed
to vote twice, but no evidence of non-accidental causes); cf. Polish American Congress v. FCC,
520 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1975) (fairness doctrine does not require opportunity to reply to Polish
ethnic jokes), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1141 (1976).
Prisoners'Rights: Kimbrough v. O'Neil, No. 74-1870 (7th Cir. Oct. 29, 1976) (en banc) (prisoner
may recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for loss of property intentionally taken and retained
by deputy sheriff), rehearing ofpanel decision, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975); Bonner v. Coughlin,
545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (prisoner may not recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for loss of property because of prison guards' negligence), rehearing of panel decision, 517 F.2d
1311 (7th Cir. 1975); Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976) (prison mail censorship
regulations overbroad in violation of first and fourteenth amendments) (see text accompanying
notes 253-265 infra); Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant prison officials
were immune from civil rights damages for denying prisoner in isolation access to legal materials,
counsel and mail, because they acted in good faith); United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525
F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975) (due process requires statement of reasons for denial of parole;
requirement satisfied by statement that parole would deprecate seriousness of offense), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 94 (1976); Berkeley v. Benson, 531 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1976) (decisions requiring
meaningful consideration of parole and statement of reasons for denial not retroactive) (alternate
holding); Ross v. Mebane, 536 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1976) (habeas corpus jurisdiction over claim
that procedures for transfer and loss of good time denied due process).
Equal Protection: Youker v. Gulley, 536 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1976) (Illinois statute barring official
court reporters from outside employment does not deny equal protection or substantive due
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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Supreme Court Shadows
As in many northern cities, the public school systems in Milwaukee and
Indianapolis are de facto racially segregated. In the Milwaukee case, Arm-
strong v. Brennan,' the court this term confronted the core issue raised in
suits alleging such segregation to be unconstitutional: the kind and degree of
purposefully segregationist governmental action which must be shown. The
process); Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1975) (federal government discrimination against
illegitimate Indian child, in distribution of intestate property left by collateral heir of plaintiff's
deceased mother, denies equal protection under fifth amendment due process clause); Fisher v.
Secretary of HEW, 522 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1975) (limitations on social security eligibility for
domestic workers do not, merely because of disproportionate impact on class of poor Black
women, deny equal protection under fifth amendment due process clause); Rubin v, Weinberger,
524 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1975) (congressional foreclosure of judicial review of amount of medical
benefits claims less than $1000 does not deny equal protection under fifth amendment due
process clause).
Jurisdiction in Civil Rights Cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1331: Reich v. Freeport, 527 F.2d 666 (7th
Cir. 1976) (jurisdiction granted for first amendment and due process claims against city);
Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem. Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction granted for claim of
violation of right of marital privacy against public hospital), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1518 (1976);
Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975) (jurisdiction granted for
due process claim against public junior college district), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1748 (1976).
Standing in Civil Rights Cases: Calvin v. Conlisk, 534 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1976) (no standing to
challenge police department disciplinary procedures on allegation of speculative future harm), on
remand from 424 U.S. 909 (1976), vacating 520 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1975).
Comity in Civil Rights Cases: 28 East Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v. Cullerton, 523 F.2d 439 (7th
Cir. 1975) (federal statute limiting federal injunctions interfering with state taxation bars federal
court attack on allegedly fraudulent real estate tax assessments where adequacy of state remedy
is not uncertain), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 856, rehearing denied, 96 S. Ct. 1437 (1976); Ahrensfeld v.
Stephens, 528 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1975) (federal court must abstain from considering constitutional
issue raisedin pending state eminent domain proceedings).
Attorneys'Fees in Civil Rights Cases: Stanton v. Bond, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.) (attorneys' fees
properly awarded under equitable "bad faith" doctrine against defendant state officers in their
official capacities), vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 97 S. Ct. 479 (1976).
Immunity from Damages in Civil Rights Cases: Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1975)
(state prosecutor immune from civil rights suit for prosecuting plaintiff despite allegations of
malice and lack of probable cause); Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th
Cir. 1975) (junior college board could be sued for damages for termination of plaintiff's
employment without notice and hearing required by due process, where state had waived
immunity by authorizing board to be sued), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1748 (1976); cf. Colton v.
Swain, 527 F.2d 296(7th Cir. 1975) (sheriffs' deputies, defendants in civil rights damages action,
could file third-party claim against their insurer for determination of extent of coverage); United
States v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975) (criminal prosecution for violation of civil rights),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976).
Right of Privacy: Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976) (fourth
amendment prohibits immigration officers from stopping persons of Mexican descent or having
Spanish surnames for questioning, without warrant, probable cause or reasonable suspicion
based on specific articulable facts that person stopped is an illegal alien), aff'd in part and vacated
in part for modification, No. 75-2019(7th Cir. Jan. 26, 1977) (en banc) (stops for mere questioning
without detention require only reasonable belief that person stopped is an alien); Fitzgerald v.
Porter Mem. Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1975) (right of marital privacy not violated by
excluding husband from delivery room), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1518 (1976).
7. 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'g Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F. Supp.
765 (E.D. Wis. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1976) (No.
76-809).
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court faced one of the key follow-up questions in the Indianapolis case,
United States v. Board of School Commissioners:8 once unconstitutional
segregation in central city schools is proved, what more must be shown to
support a remedial decree embracing not just the largely black city but the
nearly all-white suburbs as well?
In both cases the court labored in the shadows of prior United States
Supreme Court rulings. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in the Denver
schools case, Keyes v. School District No. 1,9 the court of appeals
in Armstrong unanimously affirmed the district court's finding, on slen-
der evidence, that segregation in Milwaukee schools was in some
measure attributable to intentionally discriminatory governmental action, and
hence unconstitutional. In Board of School Commissioners, a divided court
struggled in the doorway left open by Milliken v. Bradley.I0 There the
Supreme Court had barred metropolitan-wide remedies for segregation in
central city schools except where an "interdistrict violation and interdistrict
effect is shown." 1 The Board of School Commissioners majority held that
Indianapolis fit this "interdistrict" exception, apparently relying on two
factors: first, a 1969 state law which in effect unified Indianapolis and its
suburbs for purposes of most major government services but not schools, and
second, the confinement of all public housing for family occupancy to the
central city. It therefore affirmed the lower court's "limited interdistrict
remedy," which ordered one-way transfer of black Indianapolis students to
the suburbs and enjoined further construction of public housing in the central
city.12 Judge Tone, author of the court's opinion in the Milwaukee case and
originally assigned to write the Indianapolis opinion as well, dissented. 13 It
was not enough under Milliken, he argued, to show that the school district
boundary and housing decisions had interdistrict "effect"; in his view their
purpose also must be racially discriminatory, and the record was devoid of
findings or evidence of such a purpose.14
The Indianapolis decision has been reviewed by the Supreme Court,
which has vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration; 15
8. 541 F.2d 1211(7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 25,
1977) (Nos. 76-212, 458, 468, 515, 520, and 522), for further consideration in light of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
9. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
10. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
11. Id. at 745.
12. 541 F.2d at 1212.
13. Id. at 1224.
14. Id.
15. See note 8 supra and text accompanying notes 135-154 infra.
The Court was also asked this term to review an analogous case which involved Wilmington,
Delaware, Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976) (three-judge court), but the Court
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, 45 U.S.L.W. 3399 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1976) (Nos.
76-416, 474, 475, 499, 500, 501). While the Court did not explain its reasoning, it may have
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and a petition for certiorari has been filed in Armstrong. 16 Apart from the
substantive and procedural issues they separately raise, these two cases share
the distinction of indicating the court of appeals' initial response to the
Supreme Court's June 1976 ruling in Washington v. Davis ,17 a decision with
potentially pervasive implications for the entire field of race discrimination
law. In Davis, the Supreme Court, "with all due respect" to a host of
contrary lower court decisions including three from this circuit,"8 held that
"the substantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official
practice standing alone and without regard to discriminatory purpose" does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause.19 To be unconstitutional, the law or
practice "must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. "20
Will Davis be a watershed or merely force some courts to follow a
different route to the same result? As the Supreme Court was careful to note
and as Mr. Justice Stevens highlighted in his thoughtful concurring opinion,
purpose may of course be inferred from "the totality of the relevant facts"
including racially discriminatory effect, which sometimes suffices to estab-
lish a prima facie case.21 In Armstrong, the court of appeals sustained such an
inference by the trial judge; Davis does not appear to have altered substantial-
ly the analysis, and to date has not altered its result. 22 In Board of School
Commissioners, on the other hand, Davis has already led to a remand and
may yet alter the result. Judge Tone's dissent cast Davis in a leading role. 23
Davis mattered to him not only because the district court had not attributed
the school district boundary and housing decisions to racially discriminatory
governmental purpose, but because in his view it could not do so on the
record. 24 Perhaps the comparative judicial inexperience in assessing the types
of governmental decisions attacked in Board of School Commissioners, in
accepted the Solicitor General's arguments that the three-judge court had no jurisdiction to issue
the remedial order and that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over any appeal from the
three-judge court's ruling. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1976, at 32, col. 3 (city ed.). See text
accompanying notes 78-79, 90 infra.
16. See note 7 supra.
17. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
18. Id. at 244. The three cases from this circuit included Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977)
(zoning); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (dictum) (7th Cir. 1971) (public housing); and
United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 553 (N.D. I1l. 1974) (public employment).
Another early reaction of the court of appeals to Washington, involving race and sex discrimi-
nation in hiring and promotion within the Chicago Police Department, was issued too recently
to include in this review. United States v. City of Chicago, Nos. 76-1113, 1152, 1205 and 1344
(7th Cir. Jan. 11, 1977), aff'g in part, rev 'g in part and remanding forfurther proceedings, 411 F.
Supp. 218 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
19. 426 U.S. at 244.
20. Id. at 240.
21. Id. (majority) and id. at 253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. See 539 F.2d at 633-34.
23. 541 F.2d at 1224-25.
24. Id.
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contrast to the familiar local school board ploys involved in the Milwaukee
case, 25 made Judge Tone less ready to infer discriminatory purpose in the
absence of direct evidence. While it is clearly premature to be definitive,
Armstrong and Board of School Commissioners together suggest that the
court of appeals' likely reaction to Davis may in each case turn on the extent
of precedent for inferring discriminatory purpose from comparable fact
patterns.
Armstrong
Armstrong applies the law established in Keyes and precedent from this
circuit 26 to new but not very different facts. It exemplifies how little evidence
is needed for a district court properly to find a governmental purpose to
discriminate, and how lenient the court of appeals will be with such a finding
once made, even after Davis.
In a context of clear, system-wide statistical racial imbalance, 27 the
district court found defendants' school boundary and siting decisions, busing
practices, open transfer policies and faculty assignments to have contributed
often slightly, sometimes considerably, to the racial imbalance, and almost
never to have alleviated it. 28 From these acts having racially discriminatory
effect, from ambiguous but suggestive testimony, 29 and from defendants'
refusal to adopt integration proposals,3" the district court inferred a racially
discriminatory purpose, even though defendants "always had a nondis-
criminatory explanation for their acts:" 31
While the explanations 'on an isolated basis seem reasonable and at
times educationally necessary,' when considered together, the acts
demonstrated, the judge found, 'a consistent and deliberate policy
of racial isolation and segregation ..... . . . The court found it
'hard to believe that out of all the decisions made by school
authorities under varying conditions over a twenty-year period,
mere chance resulted in there being almost no decision that resulted
in the furthering of integration.' 3z
"Viewing all the evidence," the court of appeals concluded that the
district court was "not clearly erroneous" in finding segregatory purpose.
"While arguably no individual acts carried unmistakable signs of racial
25. For example, the court characterized the "intact busing" program of the Armstrong
defendants as a " 'commonly used', 'classic segregative technique.' " 539 F.2d at 635 (quoting
Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 787 (6th Cir. 1974)).
26. See the decision on the merits in the Indianapolis case, 474 F.2d 81(7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973), and United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968).
It was not always so. See Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963).
27. See 539 F.2d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 1976).
28. See id. at 629-32, 635-37, for a discussion of these district court findings.
29. Id. at 634-35.
30. Id. at 636-37.
31. Id. at 634 (quoting 408 F. Supp. at 818-19).
32. 539 F.2d at 634 (quoting 408 F. Supp. at 819).
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purpose, it was not unreasonable to find a pattern clear enough to give rise to a
permissible inference of segregative intent." ,33 Invoking the rule that it would
not reverse findings of fact unless it was "left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed," the court tolerated instances
of "unexplained hiatus between the specific findings of fact and conclusory
findings of segregative intent" and accorded the district court "a presumption
of consistency." 34
Plaintiffs' success to date in Armstrong may augur little outside the
Milwaukee city limits. In most northern school desegregation cases, the
decisive issue is whether defendants' purpose is discriminatory or racially
neutral. The literal import of the court of appeals' opinion in Armstrong is
that in resolving the question of purpose the district court has extremely broad
leeway--either way. Even though plaintiffs in Armstrong compiled a mas-
sive amount of evidence, in the end their proof of discriminatory purpose
amounted to no more than the stuff of which "permissible inferences" are
made. In theory at least, another district judge could have decided this case or
another one like it the other way, and in that event the court of appeals'
reasoning in Armstrong would almost certainly compel affirmance of that
opposite result.
If the law indeed permits such unpredictably inconsistent decisions in
school desegregation cases, that state of affairs should be disconcerting to
practitioners on both sides and even more so to the public, for whom
momentous issues of social policy in that event turn largely on a single judge's
weighing of subjective, elusive evidence. But if uncertainty reigns, Arm-
strong cannot be blamed. The court of appeals did no more than follow the
Supreme Court's edict in Keyes that "the differentiating factor between de
jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation. . . is purpose or intent
to segregate." 35
In a cogent concurring opinion in Keyes, Mr. Justice Powell warned that
this test would lead not just to cases like Armstrong, but also to cases reaching
opposite results on analogous facts.36 The Keyes majority's focus on intent,
he argued, is both unfair and unrealistic. It is unfair because "the facts
deemed necessary to establish de jure discrimination present problems of
subjective intent which the courts cannot fairly resolve. " 37 The results of
litigation "will be fortuitous, unpredictable and even capricious"; most
importantly, "[a]ny test resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as a
school board's segregative 'intent' provides inadequate assurance that minor-
33. 539 F.2d at 636-37.
34. Id. at 634, 636.
35. 413 U.S. at 208 (original emphasis), quoted in Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d at 633.
36. 413 U.S. at 208.
37. Id. at 225.
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ity children will not be shortchanged in the decisions of those entrusted with
the nondiscriminatory operation of our public schools. "38
One might respond that courts every day are faced with problems of
determining subjective intent, and that potential and actual inconsistency in
the determination is an inherent imperfection in our judicial system. But in
such inquiries courts are not unaided by rules which structure decisions,
setting boundaries upon and establishing criteria for the exercise of discre-
tion. Mr. Justice Powell's point in Keyes is not that intent should be
abandoned as an element of the cause of action, 39 but rather that trial judges
should be afforded more precise guidance, related to objective, ascertainable
facts, for determining subjective intent. Specifically, he proposes "quite
simply" that "[a] prima facie case of constitutional violation exists when
segregation is found to a substantial degree in the schools of a particular
district. "1 A demonstration of clear racial imbalance, such as that found in
the Milwaukee schools, would shift the burden to the defendants to prove the
segregation not purposeful.41 Although Mr. Justice Powell does not so state,
such a burden would be difficult to meet and the results of litigation in most
cities would be uniform: plaintiffs would prevail.42
But is it justifiable, in the name of uniformity of decision, to structure the
rules so that one side always loses? Mr. Justice Powell's answer requires
some explaining.
[S]egregated schools-wherever located-are not solely the pro-
duct of the action or inaction of public school authorities. Indeed,
.... ,there can be little doubt that the principal causes of the
pervasive school segregation found in the major urban areas of this
country, whether in the North, West, or South, are the
socioeconomic influences which have concentrated our minority
citizens in the inner cities while the more mobile white majority
disperse to the suburbs.43
But, he adds later in his opinion,
there is also not a school district in the United States, with any
significant minority population, in which the school authorities-in
one way or another-have not contributed in some measure to the
38. Id. at 233, 227.
39. If his concurring opinion in Keyes left any doubt on this score, it was resolved by his
joining the majority opinion in Davis. 426 U.S. at 231.
40. 413-U.S. at 224 and n.10.
41. Mr. Justice Powell actually goes a bit further in Keyes. He would have the burden shift
to defendants to demonstrate that they are "operating a genuinely integrated school system," by
which he means one in which school officials "make and implement their customary decisions
with a view toward enhancing integrated school opportunities." Id. at 224, 226. However, one
need not venture so far beyond the majority's view in Keyes to utilize a prima facie rule. For
example, as the text suggests, the burden, once shifted, might simply require defendants to
demonstrate that their actions were not purposefully segregatory.
42. This certainly seems to be the result Mr. Justice Powell expects. See id. at 223, 228-30,
236, 252-53.
43. Id. at 235-36.
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degree of segregation which still prevails. Instead of recognizing
the reality of similar, multiple segregatory causes in school districts
throughout the country, the Court persists in a distinction whose
duality operates unfairly on local communities in one section of the
country [the South] and on minority children in the others. 44
In other words, under a "purpose" test defendants are doomed to lose in
the South, where a recent history of openly purposeful segregation is easily
proved, while some Northern defendants, equally culpable for present
segregation, may be let off the hook by evidentiary accident. Mr. Justice
Powell's prima facie case rule would keep the Northerners on the hook too.
But his predictions of arbitrary inconsistency, defensible enough in
theory, have apparently not come to pass in cases applying the Keyes test.
Indeed, the prima facie case rule he advocated in Keyes may already have
been implicitly adopted by the lower federal courts. Despite their discretion to
refuse to find segregatory intent, district judges have generally inferred it
from facts like those in Armstrong in suits in Boston,45 Brooklyn,46 Detroit ,
47
Denver, 48 and elsewhere,4 9 as well as in the Milwaukee and Indianapolis
cases reviewed here. Thus Armstrong may be an exemplar of the "new prima
facie case": if a city's public schools are substantially racially imbalanced,
and if the effect of school siting, boundary, busing, faculty assignment
policies and the like has been in some measure to contribute to this imbalance,
44. Id. at 252-53.
45. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
46. Hart v. Community School Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975) (single junior high school).
47. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd in part, vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 418
U.S. 717 (1974).
48. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973), the opinion on
remand from the United States Supreme Court, the district court found system-wide segrega-
tion. Compare that court's opinions before the Supreme Court ruling, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D.
Colo. 1967) and 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990
(10th Cir. 1971), modified and remanded, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
49. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd, 508
F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (Kalamazoo, Mich.); Brinkman v.
Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974) (Dayton, Ohio), cert. granted on other grounds sub nom.
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 45 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1977) (No. 76-539); Soria v.
Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 386 F. Supp. 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974), on remandfrom 488 F.2d
579 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974) (Oxnard, Cal.); Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973) (Clarke County, Las Vegas, Nev.); Davis v.
School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 913 (1971) (Pontiac, Mich.); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501
(C.D. Cal. 1970) (Pasadena, Cal.); and Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967),
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc)
(Washington, D.C.).
,But see Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974) (Grand Rapids, Mich.),
discussed at note 50 infra; United States v. School Dist., 389 F. Supp. 293 (D. Neb. 1974), rev'd,
521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946, on remand, 418 F. Supp. 22 (D. Neb.),
aff'd, 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3477 (U.S. Nov. 19,
1976) (No. 76-705), discussed at note 51 and accompanying text infra.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
then a prima facie case of segregatory purpose on the part of responsible
officials is established. The burden shifts to defendants to prove that their
purposes were non-discriminatory.
But if this is the de facto rule of decision in these cases, it should be
formalized to avoid the fluke, but potentially unfair and disruptive, possibility
that some city-perhaps Chicago-could have its desegregation case decided
by a judge who rejects the pattern of decisions elsewhere and refuses to find
segregatory purpose on facts like those in Armstrong.5 Indeed, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has already formalized such a rule, holding that
''a presumption of segregative intent arises once it is established that school
authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the natural, probable and
foreseeable consequences of which is to bring about or maintain segre-
gation. "51
Moreover, experience in these cases reinforces Mr. Justice Powell's
argument in Keyes that the prima facie case rule should be streamlined even
further. Since racial segregation in schools has been consistently found
attributable in significant part to actions by school officials, 52 courts can fairly
dispense with the requirement that plaintiffs, to prove causation, amass
50. It is debatable whether the Grand Rapids, Michigan case is such a fluke. Higgins v.
Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974). The district court's findings for defendants were
accepted as not "clearly erroneous" and were also concurred in by the court of appeals, despite
evidence of purposeful segregation. 508 F.2d at 783, 797. The clearest evidence of purpose was
in the faculty assignment, which the district court found had been on a racially discriminatory
basis; but this was not a "substantial or significant contributing cause of school segregation."
Id. at 783, 788. In addition, there were a "few instances of changes of boundary lines and feeder
patterns," id. at 786, and defendants had abandoned their voluntary integration plan, after first
shaping it to prevent "white flight," by closing black schools and integrating blacks into white
schools, not the other way around. Id. at 789, 793-95.
On the other hand, Higgins is so distinguishable from cases like Armstrong that its result
might be the same even under the prima facie rule suggested in the text. First, the degree of racial
segregation in schools, regardless of its cause, was less in Grand Rapids than in Milwaukee;
indeed, less than in Knoxville, Tennessee, which the same court of appeals had recently found to
have attained "a unitary system after earlier court-ordered desegregation." Id. at 787 (citing
Goss v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973) ), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974). More
importantly, such racial balance as did exist in Grand Rapids was largely attributable to the Board
of Education's voluntary integration plan which, despite its shortcomings, clearly impressed the
court with the board's good faith and which contrasted sharply with the recalcitrance of school
officials in Milwaukee. Id. at 787, 794, 795. In addition, "many of the more commonly used or
classic segregative techniques found in other cases were absent in Grand Rapids." Id. at 787.
These last two factors might, in context, suffice to rebut the prima facie inference of discrimina-
tion, which itself is less forceful than in other cases because here there was less segregation.
Nonetheless, while these distinctions make the Grand Rapids board less culpable than
others, it is difficult entirely to exculpate school officials from the segregation and, as Justice
Powell suggests, too much should not be made of distinctions in the degree of fault in contributing
to school segregation. If the Grand Rapids case bears a lesson for school officials, it is that an
ounce of voluntary desegregation now may prevent a pound of court-ordered desegregation later.
That lesson, learned nationwide, would produce results neither uniform nor fair.
51. United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530,535-36 (8th Cir. 1975). For history, see note
49 supra; but see Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517, 517 and n. 1
(1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
52. But see Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), discussed at note 50
supra.
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evidence of myriad siting, busing, pupil-transfer and other decisions by local
officials. Instead, the prima facie case should be deemed made whenever
plaintiffs prove a substantial degree of racial segregation in a school system.
Such a rule would place the burden of adducing evidence about their past
decisions on defendants, the party with more ready access to this evidence.
This allocation of burdens would not only be fair to the parties, but might
promote more efficient and expeditious litigation by minimizing discovery
and introduction of evidence.
53
Board of School Commissioners
The remedial decree in Board of School Commissioners, which pro-
vides for transferring Indianapolis students across district lines into suburban
districts, is arguably not "interdistrict" in the Milliken sense. The transfer of
students is within the area which, but for assertedly discriminatory acts by the
state, would have been a single, metropolitan-wide school district. If Milli-
ken is nonetheless regarded as controlling, the Indianapolis case presents the
issue of what constitutes an "interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect"
under Milliken, 54 sufficient to authorize a metropolitan-wide, interdistrict
remedy for segregation in central city schools.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Board of School Commissioners
purported to address this general issue directly. Instead, both opinions
focused on an aspect of the question: must the government actions which
constitute the interdistrict violation, and which have interdistrict effect, also
have a segregatory purpose to justify interdistrict relief under Milliken? On
the Indianapolis facts, the majority seemed to say no. Judge Tone disagreed
and dissented, perceiving no evidence or findings of segregatory purpose in
the school district boundary and housing site decisions claimed as interdistrict
violations. The Supreme Court, in its subsequent order of remand, has
implied that a finding of segregatory purpose is a necessary predicate for the
student transfer orders, while leaving open the possibility that such a finding
can properly be made, either on this record or on the basis of further
proceedings. 55
53. "The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon
a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary." United States v.
New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 355 U.S. 253,256 n.5 (1957). Of course, a presumption in the interest
of fairness and convenience, such as the one suggested in the text, must be supported at least by
"some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed." Mobile, J.
& K.C.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35,44 (1910) (legislative presumption in a civil case); see
generally Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767-85 (1975). The connection between school
segregation and purposeful state action, as argued in the text, is at least rational. Arguably, it
meets even the more stringent standard for legislative presumptions in criminal statutes, which
are valid only if "it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 34 (1969).
54. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
55. See note 8 supra.
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In earlier phases of this litigation the central city school board had been
found culpable of purposeful segregation by the district court in 1971,56 and
the court of appeals had affirmed this ruling in 1973. 57 The district court had
then ordered a "broad interdistrict remedy" 58 after finding that desegregation
within the central city would only lead to resegregation by provoking white
flight to the suburbs, and that the State of Indiana, with power over suburban
school districts, had participated in the central city segregation.5 9 On appeal,
the central city portion of the remedy and the findings against the state were
affirmed. But the portion of the order involving suburbs outside the boun-
daries of the metropolitan governmental unit known as "Uni-Gov" was
reversed, while that involving suburbs within "Uni-Gov" was remanded for
further proceedings in light of Milliken, which the Supreme Court had just
decided. 6°
On remand, the district court ordered a "limited interdistrict remedy"
involving the one-way transfer of black Indianapolis students in grades one
through nine to suburbs within "Uni-Gov," in such numbers that within two
years all but two suburban school districts would become fifteen percent black
in total enrollment .6 1 To support this remedy, the district court apparently
relied on three factors. 62 First was the "Uni-Gov" act passed by the Indiana
56. 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
57. 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
58. The remedy is so characterized in the most recent court of appeals opinion. 541 F.2d at
1213.
59. 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973); see also 368 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D. Ind. 1973).
60. 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975).
61. 419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975). The remedy, characterized as "limited" by the court
of appeals, 541 F.2d at 1212, is detailed at 419 F. Supp. at 185-86. By the second year,
approximately 10,000 black students would be transferred. 541 F.2d at 1215.
The Indianapolis school board raised in its petition for certiorari some interesting questions
not raised by the other petitioners, and not addressed by the court of appeals, about the
procedures used by the district court in issuing the remedial order, and about the order's
unfairness toward blacks, the central city school district, city residents and city teachers. The
questions are important in this case and could become important nationwide if the resolution of
the threshold issues discussed in this article leads to metropolitan-wide remedies in other cities.
Among these questions were: (1) whether the court exceeded its statutory jurisdiction or
improperly exercised its equitable powers by issuing the order without giving school districts and
other affected parties opportunity to present alternative plans, "without hearing and determining
feasibility and propriety thereof," without making findings required by 20 U.S.C. §§ 1713 and
1755, and without providing opportunity for community participation in development of volun-
tary remedial plan as required by 20 U.S.C. § 1758, Petition for Certiorari, United States v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 45 U.S.L.W. 3372, 3-372 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976); (2) whether it was proper to
order "solely involuntary transfer of black students to school systems of which their parents are
not voting constituents, without any corresponding requirement for transfer of white students
and without any conditions to assure that educational opportunities offered transferred black
students will be thereby improved," id.; (3) whether the order improperly "financially burdens
and discriminates against city school system by requiring payments under state law to suburban
school systems in excess of their increased costs attributable to transferred students," id. at
3372-73; and (4) whether the order was proper even though it "necessarily will require closing of
substantial number of city school facilities without proof of their inferiority and dismissal of
substantial number of teachers and staff without requiring employment of any additional staff by
suburban schools?" Id. at 3373.
62. See 419 F. Supp. at 182-83.
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General Assembly in 1969, when the Indianapolis school desegregation suit
was already pending.63 Uni-Gov transformed Marion County, within which
Indianapolis and ten other school districts were located, into a metropolitan
government responsible for most government services, including police and
fire services. Some services were excluded, most conspicuously among them
schools. 64 In addition, within Uni-Gov there remained three "excluded
cities," which retained their own local governments while receiving some
services from Uni-Gov. 65 The district court found that by excluding schools
from Uni-Gov, the Indiana legislature "signaled its lack of concern with the
whole problem and thus inhibited desegregation [of the Indianapolis Public
School District].'' 66 Its order transferring Indianapolis black students in-
volved only school districts within Uni-Gov. 67
Second, the district court apparently relied on the fact that the eleven
public housing projects for family occupancy in the Indianapolis area, all
predominantly black, had all been sited within the boundaries of the central
city school district, including six on or near the district boundary. 68 The
district court found that these siting decisions "obviously tended to cause and
to perpetuate the segregation of black pupils in [Indianapolis Public School
District] territory.' '69 In addition to grounding the pupil transfer orders partly
on this finding, it separately enjoined the housing authority from building any
future public housing projects within the boundaries of the central city school
district.70
63. Id. at 183. For a discussion of Uni-Gov, see 541 F.2d at 1214, 1215-16, 1220-22. The
court noted: "It must be kept in mind that at this time both the General Assembly and the
suburban school districts knew that this action was pending in the district court." Id. at 1220.
64. Id. at 1216. Other excluded functions were "[f]or example, the airport authority, the
county courts, the building authority, and the hospital corporation." Id. School services stand
out as exceptional among these excluded services because of the federal suit involving schools
which was then pending, the greater threat of desegregation orders affecting large numbers of
suburban residents posed by a metropolitan-wide school district, and the contemporaneous
repeal of a prior Indiana statute which had required school district boundaries to expand with
those of a city annexing its suburbs. Indianapolis was considering annexation if Uni-Gov did not
pass, and the court referred to the duo of Uni-Gov and the annexation repeal statute as
"fail-safe" measures designed to keep the Indianapolis school district from expanding to include
suburbs. Id. at 1220.
65. Id. at 1216. The cities are Speedway, Perry and Lawrence.
66. 419 F. Supp. at 183.
67. Id. Students were ordered transferred only to the eight most white of the ten suburban
school districts within Uni-Gov. All eight appealed to the court of appeals, 541 F.2d at 1215, and
five of the eight, including the three districts corresponding to the "excluded cities" under
Uni-Gov, then appealed to, or petitioned for certiorari to, the United States Supreme Court.
68. 419 F. Supp. at 182. See also 541 F.2d at 1216. Before Uni-Gov, the local housing
authority, which was authorized to build up to five miles outside the city limits upon agreement
with suburban governments, had been uniformly jilted by the suburbs. After Uni-Gov, the
authority was empowered to build without agreement in most suburbs, but still it had never done
so, arguing that adequate transportation and other services did not exist. "There was evidence
however, that these services could have been arranged." Id. at 1216.
69. 419 F. Supp. at 182.
70. Id. at 186. See text accompanying notes 130-134 infra.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
The district court also apparently relied on a third factor, "the customs
and usages of both the officials and inhabitants" of Indianapolis suburbs "to
discourage blacks from seeking to purchase or rent homes therein."71 The
court of appeals, however, did not discuss or appear to rely on this factor
separately from the public housing site selections.
In short, the district court found both Uni-Gov and public housing siting
to have the effect of perpetuating segregation on both sides of the Indianapolis
Public School District boundary, but did not explicitly find either to have a
segregatory purpose.
The court of appeals majority affirmed, holding that a purpose to
segregate was unnecessary, at least with respect to Uni-Gov. 72 Citing Brown
//73 and Green v. County School Board ,7 the two major Supreme Court
decisions on the affirmative obligation of school officials to desegregate once
past de jure segregation is proved, the majority opined that the Indiana
General Assembly, at the time it enacted Uni-Gov, "had an obligation to
alleviate the segregated condition in IPS." 75 Omitting schools from Uni-Gov
had violated this obligation. Considerations of tax levels and citizen participa-
tion, which perhaps underlay retention of separate school districts, "although
apparently not racially motivated, cannot justify legislation that has an
obvious racial segregative impact. ",76
By this, the majority may have meant that Uni-Gov, racially discrimina-
tory in effect if not in purpose, supplied the "interdistrict violation and
interdistrict effect" which had been missing in Milliken. Next, however, the
majority's reasoning suggested that a Milliken interdistrict violation was not
really necessary to support the remedy granted below because this case was
not truly interdistrict:
In this case we are dealing with a situation in which but for certain
events chargeable to the state, Marion County would be either a
consolidated school district. . . or IPS would have been expanded
with the civil city of Indianapolis under Uni-Gov. In this context
there is nothing talismanic about the word 'district,' for school
district lines are not sacronsanct [sic].'
To support its views that segregatory purpose was unnecessary and that
Milliken was distinguishable, the majority cited Evans v. Buchanan,78 a
Wilmington, Delaware case which the court considered factually analogous.
71. Id. at 183.
72. See notes 84-85 and accompanying text infra.
73. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
74. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
75. 541 F.2d at 1220.
76. Id. at 1220-21.
77. Id. at 1221.
78. 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.) (3-judge court), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). For subsequent
history, see note 15 supra.
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There a statute generally reorganizing Delaware school districts had explicitly
excluded Wilmington. Although the statute was found not purposefully
discriminatory, it had a "pronounced racial effect" and was invalidated for
lack of a "compelling state interest." 79 The three-judge district court's
decision had been summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court.80
The Board of School Commissioners majority then held that the limited
interdistrict remedy ordered below was proper on the basis of Uni-Gov
alone. 8' In addition, in proceeding next to affirm the lower court's injunction
with respect to public housing segregation, the court implied that the housing
site selections also supported the order transferring students to suburban
schools. The court first quoted findings below that public housing segregation
in Indianapolis had the effect of perpetuating school segregation. Then,
although the district court had not made any express findings of discrimina-
tory purpose in the housing site selection, the court itself found such a
purpose within the record, which "clearly show[ed] a 'purposeful, racially
discriminatory use of state housing.' "82
Thus the majority attempted to bring the case within Mr. Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Milliken, quoting the language in which he
had identified housing policy as one potential "interdistrict violation" which
might support an interdistrict remedy. 83 Although the majority had made no
finding of discriminatory purpose with respect to Uni-Gov as an interdistrict
violation, clearly such a finding was necessary with respect to the housing site
decisions because of Mr. Justice Stewart's use of the term "purposeful." The
majority made no effort to resolve the arguable contradiction in requiring a
discriminatory purpose for one sort of interdistrict violation but not for
another.
Finally, the majority upheld the particular mandatory transfer orders
issued by the district court. 84
Judge Tone, in dissent, did not respond to the majority's suggestion that
the case was not interdistrict in the Milliken sense, except to argue that the
issue was foreclosed by the court's earlier opinion which remanded the case.
85
79. 393 F. Supp. at 441, 445.
80. Evans v. Buchanan, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
81. 541 F.2d at 1222.
82. Id. at 1223 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ).
83. 541 F.2d at 1223.
84. Id. at 1223-24. Judge Tone did not explicitly dissent from this aspect of the opinion, but
under his reasoning he did not reach the issue. The federal plaintiffs, as opposed to the
intervening black child plaintiffs, objected to the mandatory aspect of the transfers, while
supporting the propriety of metropolitan-wide relief in some form.
85. Id. at 1225. "That Milliken controls here... was of course recognized in our decision
on the second appeal, . . ." Id. Judge Tone's argument on this point is not persuasive. The
earlier remand was couched as follows: "The district court should determine whether the
establishment of the Uni-Gov boundaries without a like reestablishment of IPS boundaries
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In his view the only question was whether Uni-Gov and the siting of public
housing projects constituted "interdistrict violations" sufficient under Milli-
ken to justify an interdistrict remedy. 86 They did not, he argued, because
under Davis87 they could not be constitutional violations unless purposefully
discriminatory, and the record contained no findings or evidence of such a
purpose.88 Green concededly imposed an affirmative duty on the State of
Indiana to desegregate, but only with respect to the school district within
which the state had purposefully participated in racial segregation-
Indianapolis. 89 Evans was distinguishable because Wilmington had a history
of pre-Brown segregation practiced on an interdistrict basis. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's summary affirmance did not necessarily imply approval of
its reasoning, which "clearly cannot stand after Washington v. Davis."90
Who has the better argument? The question is of course not easy, but in
this writer's view the majority reached the correct result.
The Facts: Segregatory Purpose in Indianapolis
One route to the majority's conclusion is short and swift, and focuses on
facts without need for extended legal argument. Quite simply: both the
omission of schools from Uni-Gov's functions, and the exclusive choice of
central-city sites for public housing, were in significant part racially moti-
warrants an interdistrict remedy within Uni-Gov in accordance with Milliken." 503 F.2d at 86
(footnotes omitted). True, this language seems to contemplate an inquiry into whether the deci-
sion to omit schools from Uni-Gov constituted an interdistrict violation with-an interdistrict ef-
fect, which is essentially the inquiry pursued in Judge Tone's dissent. But the language does not
on its face clearly foreclose consideration of the present majority's argument that the entire
metropolitan area would have been a single district but for Uni-Gov's omission of schools.
Particularly in context, the language is ambiguous, since in the-same paragraph a clear distinc-
tion had been made between areas "beyond the Uni-Gov boundaries," as to which the original
metropolitan order was reversed, and areas within Uni-Gov, as to which the order was re-
manded. A brief, ambiguous passage in an opinion devoted chiefly to other issues should not
foreclose later de novo consideration of so important a question as whether Milliken is
distinguishable, after further, proceedings and briefing, fully exploring the effect of Uni-Gov on
the "interdistrict" issue. See 503 F.2d at 79-80, 86 & nn.22, 23.
86. "The question now is: What other constitutional rights, violation of which calls for an
interdistrict remedy, were shown on remand to have been violated by Uni-Gov and the siting of
public housing projects?" 541 F.2d at 1225.
87. See text accompanying notes 17-25 supra.
88. 541 F.2d at 1225 (Uni-Gov and housing), 1225-26 (Uni-Gov), and 1228 (housing).
89. Id. at 1227.
90. Id. Moreover, Judge Tone might have pointed out,'the Evans decision summarily
affirmed by the Supreme Court was arguably not ripe for review, since it merely ordered the
submission of "alternative Wilmington-only and interdistrict plans." 393 F. Supp. at 430. When
Milliken itself was at a comparable stage the Court had declined review. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D.
Mich.), appeal dismissed, 468 F.2d 902 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972). Only after the
general contours of a metropolitan remedial order had been spelled out and ordered implemented
did the Court agree to review and thereupon reverse. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Now, the later Evans
decision, comparable in specificity to the Milliken decision given plenary review by the Court,
has again been appealed, but the appeal has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See note 15
supra. Plenary review by the Court will not be likely this term, but may occur eventually.
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vated. Even if Judge Tone is correct that Milliken rigidly controls the
Indianapolis case, and that the government actions constituting the "interdis-
trict violations" must have been purposefully discriminatory, an interdistrict
remedy is appropriate here.
On the second point-the housing sites-the majority could not restrain
itself from following this route. Why else were all eleven housing sites
selected within the central city school district boundaries, including six on or
within a few blocks of the school district boundary? Why else were two of the
projects located on the Indianapolis side of a street dividing central city from
suburb? Why else was one project located "in a narrow peninsula of IPS that
is surrounded on three sides by Perry MSD"? 91 The housing authority argued
that adequate services were not available in the suburbs, but there was
evidence that these services "could have been arranged," and one housing
authority witness was unable to identify "any difference at all" in terms of the
authority's non-racial criteria between a suburban and a central city location
on opposite sides of the same street. 92 Why should public housing be any
exception to the "customs and usages of both the officials and inhabitants" of
the suburbs, which the district court found were "to discourage blacks from
seeking to purchase or rent homes therein" ?
9 3
In the absence of a credible non-racial explanation, the majority found
that the record "clearly shows a 'purposeful, racially discriminatory use of
state housing.' " Its finding was in accord both with other judicial findings
on comparable facts 95 and with Mr. Justice Stevens' reminder in Davis that
"[f]requently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence
of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state
of mind of the actor." 
96
But what of the district court's failure specifically to find as a fact that the
choice of public housing sites stemmed from a purpose on the part of
government officials to discriminate, or to acquiesce in discrimination ?9' One
can only speculate as to why the trial judge did not so find. Certainly he did
not make a contrary finding, and the thrust of his opinion is consistent with
and even implies that he perceived a segregatory purpose in the siting. 98
Perhaps in light of such cases as Green he regarded a specific finding of
91. 541 F.2d at 1217 n.4.
92. Id. at 1216-17.
93. Id. at 1214.
94. Id. at 1223 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ).
95. See, e.g., Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affl'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th
Cir. 1972); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 913-14 (N.D. I1. 1969).
96. 426 U.S. at 253.
97. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,8 (1958); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731,737-40
(7th Cir. 1971).
98. 419 F. Supp. at 182-83.
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discriminatory purpose as unnecessary, and accordingly refrained from
unnessarily impugning local officials. In any event, the lack of an explicit
finding by the district court on this sole issue need not preclude the reviewing
court from inferring segregatory purpose on this otherwise adequate and
ample record. 99 For a reviewing court either to close its eyes to the apparent,
or to remand for yet another round of delay in an already protracted
adjudication of civil rights deeply affecting the educational interests of the
entire metropolitan Indianapolis population, would on this record be an
unjustified adherence to technicality.
The case is not as strong for finding a segregatory purpose in the decision
to exclude schools from Uni-Gov, but the record supports, indeed recom-
mends, an inference of such a purpose. The effect of excluding schools from
Uni-Gov, obvious beforehand to any Indiana legislator or public official, was
to perpetuate racial segregation by keeping black students inside Indianapolis
and leaving the nearly all-white suburban schools racially undisturbed. 1°
Discriminatory purpose may be inferred from this fact in combination with
others, under the "ordinary rule of tort law that a person intends the natural
and foreseeable consequences of his actions," which is applicable in discern-
ing the intent of public officials in school desegregation cases.) 0' Keeping
99. "[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate
courts," and ordinarily a court of appeals should not resolve "in the first instance" a factual
dispute not "considered by the District Court." DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, note at
450 (1974) (criminal case). The normal response of an appellate court to a trial court's failure to
make findings on a material issue is to vacate the judgment and remand for appropriate findings.
See generally 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.06[2] (1975) at 2718 and cases cited at n.l.
However, findings are not a jurisdictional requirement for appeal. Id. at 2721-23 and cases cited
2723 at n.3. In unusual cases appellate courts may themselves determine the merits even though
the findings below suffer from "lack of specificity" if a remand would not "add anything
essential to the determination of the merits," Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,45 (1975); or where
"the error is not substantial in the particular case," Rossiter v. Vogel, 148 F.2d 292, 293 (2d Cir.
1945) (citing Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1943)); or where "a full
understanding of the issues [can] be reached without the aid of findings." Davis v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 422 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1970) (dictum) (quoting Urban v. Knapp Bros.
Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 810, 816 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955)); accord, cases cited
in Davis, 422 F.2d at 1142.
Here the objective facts concerning housing site decisions have been specifically found; the
omitted finding relates only to an inference concerning subjective intent to be drawn from these
underlying findings. Because of the urgency suggested in the text, the case should not be
remanded for more specific findings if, as here, the inference is clear from findings already of
record.
100. "Because, in 1969, 95 percent of the blacks in Marion County lived in the inner city and
segregation in its schools was under attack in federal court, it is clear to us that Uni-Gov and its
companion 1969 legislation were '[a] substantial cause of interdistrict segregation.' "541 F.2d at
1220, (quoting Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745 (Stewart, J., concurring)). See also id. at 1214, 1221
(majority), and at 1227-28 (dissent) (majority's " 'racial impact' theory").
101. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 388-89 and cases cited 389 at n.6
(5th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded sub nom. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United
States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1977), for further consideration in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); but see Soria v. Oxnard School Dist.
Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
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Indianapolis in a school district separate from the suburbs, like maintaining a
neighborhood school policy in racially segregated neighborhoods, could lead
to "no other result" but continued school segregation "and this is strong
evidence of segregatory intent."
10 2
This strong evidence is aggravated by several factors. First was the
timing of the decision to exclude schools from Uni-Gov, shortly after the
Indianapolis school desegregation suit was filed. Moreover, the opposition to
including schools in Uni-Gov consisted mainly of the same suburban govern-
ments which the district court found had a custom and usage of discouraging
blacks from moving into the suburbs and which participated in the purposeful-
ly segregatory public housing site selections. In addition, the exclusion of
schools was due not to considerations unique to Uni-Gov's purpose or
function, but rather was part of a "failsafe" legislative package designed to
ensure that "by one means or another" the Indianapolis school district
boundaries would not expand into the suburbs, despite a pre-existing,
legislatively declared state policy that the boundaries of the city school district
would expand with those of the city itself. 103 Looking only to these factors, it
is difficult to avoid an inference of segregatory intent.
On the other hand, as Judge Tone observed, there were a number of
factors suggesting possible non-racial explanations for the failure to expand
the Indianapolis school district's boundaries. 104 Chief among them were fears
Neither the per curiam order of remand in the Austin case, nor Mr. Justice Powell's
concurring opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, rejected the "natural
and foreseeable consequences" theory adopted by the court of appeals below and also by the
Courts of Appeals for the First, Second and Sixth Circuits in the cases cited at 532 F.2d at 389 n.6.
Accord, United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530,535-37 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
946, on remand, 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3477
(Nov. 19, 1976) (U.S. No. 76-705). Mr. Justice Powell did not dispute the court of appeals' finding
of segregative intent, but suggested only that the court "may have imputed an intent far more
pervasive than the evidence justified." 45 U.S.L.W. at 3413. He quoted a portion of its opinion
which seemed to extend the "natural and foreseeable consequences" rule into a per se rule
against any neighborhood assignment policy, rather than a basis for individualized consideration
of whether a particular neighborhood assignment policy is purposefully segregative. Id. at 3413
n.l.
102. Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975).
103. 541 F.2d at 1220.
104. Id. at 1225-26. Apart from those factors discussed in the text, Judge Tone suggests five
others, some of which overlap. He first refers to "historic" opposition to school consolidation
"on non-racial grounds." Id. at 1226. But this refers to a 1959 decision not to expand the
Indianapolis school district and subsequent adherence to it. As with the Uni-Gov decision ten
years later, however, the tax and citizen participation concerns voiced on behalf of the 1959
decision do not negate an unstated racial basis. Expansion of the Indianapolis school district
boundaries then, too, would have exposed suburbs to a potential influx of blacks. Brown I had
been decided only five years earlier, and racial segregation in schools had still been official state
policy only 10 years earlier. See 541 F.2d at 1212.
Second, Judge Tone cites "the decision to leave other governmental units out of Uni-Gov."
Id. at 1226. But see note 64 supra. Third, he points out that "all school boundaries elsewhere in
the State were already frozen," id. at 1226, a fact that seems of little relevance except to
distinguish Evans. Fourth, he cites the "haphazard" pattern of past municipal annexation, which
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of higher taxes and loss of citizen interest and participation which could result
from an expanded school district. As the majority noted, these two concerns
had been "the most substantial reasons advanced" against an earlier attempt
to consolidate Marion County school districts. 10
5
While these tax and citizen participation explanations, like a "neighbor-
hood school policy," may be partial explanations, they do not necessarily
negate an additional explanation-race.10 6 There is nothing inconsistent in
suburban opposition to school consolidation on all three grounds: tax, citizen
participation, and race. But only the first two are likely to be vocalized,
especially when a desegregation suit is pending in the local federal court-
house. Where, as here, the objective evidence from which an inference of
segregatory intent can be drawn is strong, little can be made of the fact that
racial grounds for opposition have not been openly voiced but other grounds
have.107 In finding the "natural and foreseeable consequences" rule especial-
"depended in large part upon the position taken by the owners of the land affected" and their
economic interests. Id. But this of course does not address the special racial threat posed by
school district boundaries, nor does it conflict with additional racial explanations. Finally, he
relies on the plaintiffs' failure to offer direct evidence of racial motive, to cross-examine defense
witnesses claiming other motives, or to claim racial motivation in their briefs. Id. But plaintiffs'
abstentions in this regard can be attributed to the inherent difficulty (suggested in the text) of
producing direct evidence of bias or eliciting confessions of bias from the witness stand,
combined with their legal position that no showing of discriminatory purpose was necessary.
105. 541 F.2d at 1221.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 391 (5th Cir. 1976), see
note 101 supra; see also Judge Tone's opinion sustaining a finding of discriminatory purpose in
the face of an asserted "neighborhood school policy" in Armstrong v. Brennan, 539 F.2d at 629
(although there was some testimony in Armstrong suggesting that the policy was at least racially
conscious. Id. at 635).
107. Shortly before this article was to go to print, the United States Supreme Court
commented on the situation where both racial and non-racial purposes underlie a governmental
decision, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). In a case
involving an allegedly racially discriminatory refusal to rezone a parcel of land, the Court
explained that Davis:
does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged action rested solely on racially
discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body
operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated by a single concern, or
even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one.
Id. at 563. However, the Court later added in a footnote:
[p]roof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory
purpose would not necessarily have required modification of the challenged
decision. Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village the burden of
establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible
purpose not been considered.
Id. at 566 n.2 1. This was dictum since plaintiffs in Arlington Heights had not, in the Court's view,
proved that race was even one factor in the refusal to rezone. Id. at 566. In any event, the point is
one of equitable remedies, not substantive constitutional law. The footnote concluded not that
there would have been no constitutional violation if the Village could show adequate nonracial
reasons for its decision, but only that no "judicial interference" would then be called for. Id. at
566 n.2 1. See Mr. Justice Powell's discussion of the remedial issues in his concurring opinion in
Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517, 517 (1977), see note 101 supra;
Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568, 575-76 (1977).
What Arlington Heights would mean if applied here is that, should racial motivation be
inferred from the circumstances of the decision to omit schools from Uni-Gov, the burden shifts
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ly apt in school desegregation cases, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
explained that
it is difficult-and often futile-to obtain direct evidence of the
official's intentions. Rather than announce his intention of violat-
ing antidiscrimination laws, it is far more likely that the state
official "will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are
devious, by methods subtle and illusive-for we deal with an area in
which 'subtleties of conduct . . . play no small part.' " . . .
Hence, courts usually rely on circumstantial evidence to ascertain
the decisionmakers' motivations.'0
8
Here the circumstantial evidence makes out a prima facie case of racial
motivation, unrebutted by anything in the record. Although the majority
chose not to make an inference of discriminatory intent from the circumstan-
tial evidence concerning Uni-Gov, it regarded this inference as legally
unnecessary and made no contrary inference. " But if one assumes arguendo
with Judge Tone that Uni-Gov's exclusion of schools required a discrimina-
tory purpose to qualify as an "interdistrict violation," then reviewing courts
can and should infer discriminatory purpose from this record.' 10
Accordingly, on the facts, the majority's conclusion seems correct even
if Judge Tone's view of the law holds the day.
The Law: Interdistrict "Violations"
Moreover, in this writer's view, the majority has the better of the
admittedly difficult questions raised in interpreting Milliken. Two such
questions are most pertinent here. First, what sorts of governmental actions
qualify as "interdistrict violations" under Milliken sufficient to justify
interdistrict relief? More specifically, must such actions be purposefully
discriminatory?
Before asking what constitutes an "interdistrict violation," it helps to
begin by asking what is a "violation"? In the school desegregation context,
there are two distinct lines of cases defining two distinct kinds of "viola-
tions." The first line involves an initial violation of the Constitution itself and
clearly demands proof of discriminatory purpose as an element of the
"violation." Keyes exemplifies: Denver school officials' actions which had
to defendants to prove that tax and citizen participation concerns would in any event have
excised schools from Uni-Gov's functions. The scant evidence of nonracial purpose in this
record, relating mainly to the earlier effort to consolidate rather than to Uni-Gov itself, does not
appear to carry defendants' burden. Accordingly, if on remand race is found to be one factor in
the Uni-Gov decision, a student transfer remedy within Uni-Gov would not be precluded by the
dictum at 97 S. Ct. 566 n.21 in Arlington Heights.
108. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d at 388 (citations and footnote
omitted).
109. 541 F.2d at 1221, 1222.
110. The absence of a specific finding of fact on intent by the district court need not preclude
the reviewing courts from their own assessments of this question, for the same reasons stated in
note 99 and accompanying text supra.
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the effect of maintaining racial segregation initially violated the Constitution
only if they were purposefully discriminatory."I
The second kind of "violation" is not of the Constitution itself but of a
remedial obligation, derived from the Constitution and predicated on a prior
constitutional violation. This kind of violation need not have a discriminatory
purpose, so long as it has the effect of hindering public officials' fulfillment
of their affirmative remedial obligation under Green to desegregate a school
system once it has been purposefully, unconstitutionally segregated. Thus, in
Wright v. Emporia,'12 when a city, assertedly for non-racial purposes, sought
to withdraw its schools from a county school system under desegregation
orders, the Supreme Court ruled that "[tihe existence of a permissible
purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect."" 3 In so
doing it distinguished the two kinds of "violations": initial violation of the
Constitution, and subsequent violation of the affirmative obligation to redress
the original wrong. "[Tlhe power of the District Court to enjoin Emporia's
withdrawal from that system need not rest upon an independent constitutional
violation. The Court's remedial power was invoked on the basis of a [prior]
finding that the dual school system violated the Constitution, .... "114
This suggests a misplaced emphasis in Judge Tone's reasoning in Board
of School Commissioners. In demanding that any nominee for "interdistrict
violation" under Milliken first present credentials of discriminatory purpose,
Judge Tone focuses on the first kind of violation, largely ignoring the second.
Thus he phrases the question as what "constitutional rights" did Uni-Gov or
the siting of public housing violate?' 1 5 Yet even Davis, the case upon which
his dissent heavily relies, "16 recognizes the second kind of violation, in which
"the racial impact of a law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the
critical factor." 117
Ill. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
112. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
113. Id. at 462.
114. Id. at 459.
115. 541 F.2d at 1225. Seealso note 85 and accompanying text supra. Only in a brief passage,
criticizing the majority's "attempts to avoid the necessity of finding discriminatory purpose by
postulating an affirmative duty under Green .... ," does Judge Tone come close to recognizing
the second kind of violation. Even then, he uses the term "violation" only in reference to the
underlying constitutional violation and, once, in reference to an "affirmative duty to use
interdistrict means to remedy intradistrict violations," which he says does not exist. 542 F.2d at
1227.
116. 541 F.2d at 1224, 1226-27.
117. 426 U.S. at 243. Citing Wright v. Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), for that proposition,
Davis explains that because racial segregation until 1969 supplied the "constitutional predicate"
in Wright, there was no need to find an "independent constitutional violation" to set aside the
division of the district because it "had the effect of interfering with the federal decree." The
reasoning of Wright did not turn on the existence of a federal decree, although it was an
aggravating factor, and Davis, by referring to the segregation itself as the "constitutional
predicate," does not purport to so limit Wright.
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But when Milliken uses the phrase "interdistrict violation," does it
contemplate both kinds of violations or only the first, as Judge Tone seems to
believe? There certainly is language in the holding from which one might
infer that only the first kind, violations of the Constitution itself, can justify
interdistrict relief. For example, the holding speaks of a "constitutional
violation" and a "constitutional wrong." 118 However, these terms are
ambiguous and if used in the broad sense could also encompass violations of
the remedial obligation under Green, which is derived from the Constitution
and predicated upon a constitutional violation.
Indeed, this broad sense seems to be the one intended in Milliken. Just
before its holding, the plurality opinion cites Wright for the proposition that
" [s]chool district lines . . . , are not sacrosanct and if they conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment federal courts have a duty to prescribe appropriate
remedies." 119 Similarly, Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion cites
Wright in giving as an example of a possible interdistrict violation, the
situation where "state officials . . . contributed to the separation of the races
by drawing or redrawing school district lines."' 20
What this means for the Indianapolis case is that the exclusion of schools
from Uni-Gov need not have been purposefully discriminatory to amount to
an "interdistrict violation with interdistrict effects" under Milliken. If it
violated the State of Indiana's affirmative obligation under Green to desegre-
gate Indianapolis schools, an obligation no one denies, it qualifies as a
"violation." The only remaining question 121 then would be whether this
violation had "interdistrict effects," which is also denied by no one.
The decisive question then is, did Uni-Gov without schools violate the
state's affirmative obligations? Clearly under Milliken, as Judge Tone
argues, the state had no affirmative duty to expand the city school district
boundaries in order to remedy inner city segregation. 122 In Milliken the
Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the State of Michigan was culpable for
segregation in Detroit, yet did not mandate the state to expand the Detroit
school district boundaries. 
123
118. 418 U.S. at 745. See also id. at 752.
119. Id. at 744.
120. Id. at 755.
121. Although the literal phrasing, "interdistrict violation and interdistrict effects," might
be construed to mean that the violation itself must take place in two or more districts, this is
clearly not what the Court in Milliken intended. For example, the Court illustrates the phrase with
the situation "where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial
segregation in an adjacent district." Id. at 745. Thus the acts constituting an "interdistrict
violation" may take place entirely within one district, provided that they have an effect on racial
segregation in the schools of another district. The Court later argues, referring to school
construction and site acquisition, that "there was no evidence suggesting that the State's
activities within Detroit affected the racial composition of the school population outside Detroit
or, conversely, that the State's . . . activities within the outlying districts affected the racial
composition of the schools within Detroit." Id. at 751.
122. 541 F.2d at 1227.
123. 418 U.S. at 746, 748.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
But Michigan had not also expanded the City of Detroit's boundaries to
embrace the suburbs into which students might be transferred. Nor, in the
process of doing so, had Michigan excluded schools from the expansion,
while abandoning a prior state statutory policy that the school district expand
coterminously with the city. Indiana, on the other hand, did all these things
with respect to Indianapolis. Although under no obligation to initiate the
process, once the state voluntarily undertook a comprehensive boundary
realignment potentially affecting all major government services including
schools, it could not fulfill its Green obligations without at least considering
the effect of various boundary locations on desegregation of Indianapolis
schools.124 Apparently it did not do or purport to do even this. 125
Moreover, it is arguable that Indiana's obligation to use the most
effective means to desegregate central city schools meant that it could not
exclude them from a general expansion of city boundaries without some
greater justification than a mere rational, permissible state purpose. Even if
no showing was needed of the "compelling state interest" required to justify
deliberate racial discrimination, 126 still some significant, demonstrably
threatened state interest should have been shown to justify rejection of so
obviously effective a means to fulfill the state's remedial obligations under
Green. The vague suggestions here of some tenuous threat to citizen
participation and to fair allocation of tax burdens were not enough.
The enactment of Uni-Gov, without consideration of its effect on racial
segregation, and without demonstrably adequate justification for its enact-
ment despite those effects, violated Indiana's affirmative, constitutionally
grounded obligation under Green to use the most effective means available to
desegregate Indianapolis schools. This "violation" had interdistrict effects,
since it tended to perpetuate racial segregation in both the central city and
124. Cf. Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816-17, 819, 820-23 (3d Cir. 1971). The court,
relying on statutory requirements that HUD "effectuate" and "affirmatively" promote nondis-
crimination policies, held that HUD "must utilize some institutionalized method whereby, in
considering site selection or type selection [of federally-aided-low rent housing], it has before it
the relevant racial and socioeconomic information necessary for compliance with its duties
under the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts." Id. at 821. "[C]olor blindness is impermissible." Id.
at 820.
Indiana's obligation under Green affirmatively to remedy prior constitutional violations in
Indianapolis is at least as broad and forceful as the statutory obligations relied upon in Shannon.
Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(d), 2000(d)-l, 3601, and 3608(d)(5) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) with the
quotation from Green in note 129 infra.
125. See 541 F.2d at 1214, 1225-27.
126. E.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428,439-41 (D. Del.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
Evans, however, adopted the view, clearly erroneous after Davis, that segregative effect alone
suffices to trigger the "compelling State interest" test. 426 U.S. at 242. Still, Evans may
nonetheless be affirmed on the grounds that segregatory "effect" was enough in that case. At the
time the statute with segregatory effect was enacted, "the State Board had not yet satisfied its
obligation to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation in the Wilmington schools," 393 F.
Supp. at 442, and de lure segregation had been practiced on an interdistrict basis. Id. at 437.
(Judge Tone recognized this in distinguishing Evans from the Indianapolis case. 541 F.2d at
1227). Thus Evans appears to fall within the Wright category of cases, in which discriminatory
effect is enough to show violation of a state's remedial obligations under Green. See notes 11 l- 13
and accompanying text supra.
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suburban school districts. It was, in short, an "interdistrict violation" under
Milliken. Interdistrict relief was therefore appropriate in Board of School
Commissioners.
A similar argument can be made concerning the siting of public housing.
As the Board of School Commissioners majority noted, "It is obvious that
there is a close relationship between the racial balance in housing and the
racial balance in schools.''127 Because of that close relationship, Indiana's
obligations under Green arguably included the obligation to utilize state
housing programs to maximize school desegregation in Indianapolis. 28 The
failure to do so, without even consideration of the effects of housing sites on
school desegregation, and without demonstrably adequate justification for
confining the public housing to the central city despite those effects, violated
the state's remedial obligations under Green. The siting decisions amounted
to an interdistrict violation with interdistrict effects and justified interdistrict
pupil transfers.
The housing injunction in Board of School Commissioners was not only
appropriate but could have gone even further. 129 The housing authority, an
agency of the State of Indiana, was at all relevant times empowered to operate
in an area transcending the central city boundaries. 30 Relief related to future
housing sites anywhere within Uni-Gov's boundaries (where the housing
authority can now operate) is therefore not really "interdistrict" in the
Milliken sense. Just as in Hills v. Gautreaux'31 the "relevant geographic
area" for the Chicago and federal housing agencies was the Chicago
"housing market area," 132 so the relevant geographic area for the authority's
administration of housing programs in this case is Uni-Gov. And as in Hills, a
decree directing the Indianapolis housing authority to take affirmative steps to
site new public housing in suburbs within Uni-Gov need not "impermissibly
interfere with local governments and suburban housing authorities.' ' 133
127. 541 F.2d at 1222.
128. Green speaks of an "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system..." 391 U.S. at 437-38. Green embodies an "implicit command
... . that all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effective remedy." North
Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
129. This bold statement must be subjected to at least one caveat. The district court enjoined
further public housing not only in black areas of the central city, as did the court in the Chicago
case, but in the entire central city, including its white areas. Compare 419 F. Supp. at 186 with
Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736,738-39 (N.D. Ill. 1969) and Crow v. Brown,
332 F. Supp. 382, 395-96 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972). In its petition for
certiorari, the Housing Authority questioned whether this order, by barring public housing even
in areas of the city populated by whites, contravenes "congressional policy as set out in HUD
guidelines, adopted pursuant to the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, under which racial
concentration is only one of several items to be considered and balanced in determining
location?" 45 U.S.L.W. at 3370; see note 8 supra. Even if the Housing Authority were sustained
on this contention, any defect could be cured by modifying the district court's order along the
lines set forth in Gautreaux and Crow.
130. See note 68 supra.
131. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
132. Id. at 300.
133. Id. However, Hills adds little to the extent to which interdistrict student transfers can
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Current Status of the Case
Shortly before the preceding text was to go to print, the United States
Supreme Court vacated the judgment in the Indianapolis case and re-
manded 134 for further consideration in light of Davis and the Court's recent
decision in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. 135 The most important thing to be said of this remand is that it by no
means requires reversal. 136 It does demand a re-examination of the court of
appeals' reasoning and, in particular, its initial treatment of Davis.
In light of Davis and Arlington Heights, two essential questions appear
to face the court of appeals on remand. First, was there an interdistrict
violation within Uni-Gov and, second, if there was, does it support a remedial
decree transferring students across the inner city school district line to the
extent this one does?
As to the first question, the court of appeals has at least four basic
options:
(1) The court could find no purposeful interdistrict constitutional viola-
tion and no violation outside the central city of the state's remedial obligations
and accordingly reverse the "interdistrict" portion of the decree below.
With respect to the housing violations, this option seems to have been
ruled out by the court's earlier finding of purposeful discrimination. 137 With
respect to the decision to enact Uni-Gov without schools among its functions,
this option would be inconsistent with the evidence of purposeful discrimina-
be predicated upon housing violations here. Such relief would clearly interfere with the operation
of local suburban school districts. It must therefore find justification not in a Hills theory, but
only in Milliken's authorization of interdistrict relief when there exists an interdistrict violation
with interdistrict effects. See id. at 296-97, 300-06.
134. 45 U.S.L.W. 3508 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (Nos. 76-212, 458, 468, 515, 522).
135. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), discussed at note 107 supra.
136. Compare Arlington Heights, where the Court reversed on the constitutional issue,
remanding only on a statutory issue. 97 S. Ct. at 566. Here the Court, in whose decision of remand
Mr. Justice White joined, may simply be doing what he urged in Arlington Heights. There he
dissented from the reversal, arguing:
The Court gives no reason for its failure to follow our usual practice in this situation of
vacating the judgment below and remanding in order to permit the lower court to
reconsider its ruling in light of our intervening decision. The Court's articulation of a
legal standard nowhere mentioned in Davis indicates that it feels that the application of
Davis to these facts calls for substantial analysis. If this is true, we would do better to
allow the Court of Appeals to attempt that analysis in the first instance. Given that the
Court deems it necessary to re-examine the evidence in the case in light of the legal
standard it adopts, a remand is especially appropriate. Id. at 567.
137. That finding should not be disturbed because of the Supreme Court's explication in
Arlington Heights of Davis and the factors to be considered in discerning purpose. The Su-
preme Court listed, "without purporting to be exhaustive," the following categories of "cir-
cumstantial and direct evidence": (1) the "impact," (2) the "historical background," (3) the
"specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision," (4) "[d]epartures from the
normal procedural sequence," and (5) substantive departures, "particularly if the factors
usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one
reached." 97 S. Ct. at 564.
There are no surprises in this list; indeed it reflects the kinds of factors discussed in the court
of appeals' opinion in the Indianapolis case, and which apparently underlay its finding of
purposeful discrimination in the siting of public housing.
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tion previously discussed, 38 and with the violation of the state's remedial
obligation articulated earlier. 139
(2) The court could reiterate its prior finding of racially discriminatory
purpose in the housing decisions, and make such a finding with respect to the
Uni-Gov decision for the reasons previously stated' 4° and proceed to consider
the extent of the remedy.
(3) Instead of, or in addition to, finding racial purpose, the court could
conclude that the Uni-Gov decision violated the state's remedial obligations
for the reasons already stated 141 and proceed to consider the extent of the
remedy. The Wright theory outlined above 142 was not urged upon the
Supreme Court by any of the parties and is not inconsistent with the remand
for further consideration in light of Davis and Arlington Heights. However,
the novelty of this theory in a Milliken context, coupled with its departure
from the results if not the reasoning of the Supreme Court's recent school
decisions, 143 might earn it a less hospitable reception by the Justices than
simply finding that race was a factor in the Uni-Gov decision.
(4) The court of appeals could remand to the district court for further
findings, and possibly evidentiary hearings, on the issue of whether race was
a factor in the Uni-Gov decision.
In the interest of expedition and for reasons stated earlier 144 no remand
for findings concerning racial purpose should be necessary if the court, on this
record, discerns that race was a factor.
On the other hand, if the court interprets the order of remand to condition
an interdistrict remedy on a finding of racially discriminatory purpose and is
unable to so find on this record, it would be appropriate to remand for further
findings and possibly evidentiary hearings. Neither the district court nor the
parties had the benefit of the Supreme Court's subsequent rulings in Davis
and Arlington Heights, and they ought not to be foreclosed from any
opportunity to respond to the constitutional test as newly clarified. Constitu-
tional rights are too important to be waived by lack of foresight, at least where
many courts of appeals, including this one, were also unable to predict the
Supreme Court's recent insistence upon proof and findings of racial
purpose. 145
If the court of appeals finds an interdistrict violation, it then faces the
second question, the extent of the remedy. Are interdistrict transfers which
138. See text accompanying notes 99-109 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 110-128 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 99-109 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 110-128 supra.
142. Id.
143. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1977); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Jan. 18,
1977) (No. 76-539).
144. See note 99 and text accompanying notes 98 & 99 supra.
145. See Mr. Justice White's dissent in Arlington Heights, quoted at note 137 supra.
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aim for fifteen percent minority enrollment in most schools within Uni-Gov
appropriate? 146
Until recently, this would not have been a serious question. Once a
constitutional violation was found, lower courts had a relatively free hand to
use it as the basis for a wide-ranging remedial decree within a single
district. 47 Presumably under Milliken, once an interdistrict violation were
found, the trial court could reach anywhere within the affected districts. 148
However, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that even where
interdistrict violations are shown, no interdistrict student transfers can be
ordered if defendants can show that suburban schools would have been
racially segregated even absent the violations. 149 Since it is unlikely that the
parties have had a fair opportunity to present their cases on this newly defined
issue, a remand for pertinent evidentiary presentations by both sides would
seem warranted if this remedial approach is adopted.
Especially here, where the district court has relied upon a history and
pattern of various kinds of racial segregation in Indiana,150 unraveling strands
of causation would be enormously difficult. Whether the student transfer
remedy would ultimately be sustained might depend upon how heavy a
burden of proof were in practice demanded of defendants.
Looking Forward
As the Indianapolis case already illustrates, the aftermath of Milliken
has been confusion. Under the approach there adopted and still being
elaborated by the Supreme Court, the propriety of metropolitan-wide relief
seems to turn largely on the factual idiosyncracies of each city. The results in
Detroit, Indianapolis, and Wilmington may all differ. Yet the underlying
national pattern of wrong seems too basic and too common to justify such
drastic variations in the permissible geographical scope of the remedy.
Perhaps, as Mr. Justice Powell urged in Keyes, the Supreme Court's
approach should make results depend more on common reality and less on
elaborate conceptual refinements. In the metropolitan setting, that reality is
one in which state and local government officials are neither fully responsible
for, nor wholly innocent in, the racial gap between increasingly white
146. See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra.
147. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
148. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 744-45.
149. See Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517, 517-19 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 97 S. Ct. 568, 575 (1977);
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555, 566 n.21 (1977); Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3485 (U.S. Jan.
17, 1977) (No. 76-539).
At least pending a decision in Brinkman, it is not yet clear that the burden-shifting remedial
approach stated in Mt. Healthy and Arlington Heights necessarily applies in the school desegre-
gation context. In Austin, Mr. Justice Powell argued that it does, but six Justices refrained from
joining in his concurring opinion.
150. See 419 F. Supp. at 182-83.
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suburban schools and increasingly black central city schools. A fairer, more
uniform response to this reality is needed.
If the Supreme Court eventually reverses the decrees granting interdis-
trict remedies in the Indianapolis case and in the Wilmington case which the
Court may yet give plenary review,' 5 ' uniformity of result among cities will
indeed be achieved. Milliken's meaning will then be clear: subject to rare,
hypothetical exceptions, the present Court will not require the relatively
affluent, white suburbs to participate in ameliorating the educational residue
of historic discrimination in the relatively poor, black central cities. If, on the
other hand, the Supreme Court ultimately affirms interdistrict decrees in the
pending cases, the door could be open for a gradual evolution toward a
remedial presumption like the one already used for awarding attorneys fees in
civil rights cases generally, 152 or the one used for awarding back pay'5 3 and
retroactive seniority1 54 in employment discrimination cases. Metropolitan-
wide relief would "ordinarily" be appropriate, "unless special circum-
stances would render [the remedy] unjust." 155
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE, SEX OR AGE
The court of appeals this term promoted effective judicial redress of
employment discrimination against blacks and women by a consistently
liberal interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.156 Two
non-Title VII cases, however, deserve initial comment because of their
potentially broad implications for equal protection cases generally and sex
discrimination cases in particular.
In White v. Fleming, 57 the court meticulously reviewed the recent
controversy over the proper standard of review in equal protection cases, but
at least for the moment declined to pass judgment on it. White involved a
prosecution under a Milwaukee ordinance prohibiting female employees of
taverns from sitting with male patrons. 158 In holding that the sex discrimina-
tion in the ordinance violated the equal protection clause, the court identified
151. See note 15 supra.
152. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (school desegregation);
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).(public accommodations).
153. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). "[G]iven a finding of unlawful
discrimination, backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally, would not
frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy
and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421.
Analogously, the Court could rule in school cases that metropolitan relief should be denied only
for reasons which, if applied generally, would not effectively bar the remedy throughout the
nation.
154. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Franks applied the backpay test
of Albemarle, see note 153 supra, verbatim to seniority relief. 424 U.S. at 770-71.
155. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973).
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter refered to as Title
VII].
157. 522 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1975). White was decided late last term.
158. Id. at 730-31. The ordinance also prohibited female employees from sitting or standing
at or behind the bar. Its several "interwoven" provisions were struck down in their entirety. Id.
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three general standards of review, but did not clearly indicate which standard
it was applying in the case at bar.
The first standard was the "rational basis" test, which demands that a
legislative classification bear a rational relationship to the objective of the law
in which it appears. The second was the "strict scrutiny" test, under which
discrimination can be justified only if essential to promote a "compelling
state interest," and which has been used in cases involving "fundamental
interests" or "suspect classifications." Four Justices of the United States
Supreme Court-but only four-have opined that sex is such a suspect
classification. 159 The third, "intermediary" standard has been invoked by
some courts dissatisfied with the unhappily rigid choice between the first test,
which almost any discriminatory law can meet, and the second test, which
almost none can meet. For lack of a better shorthand, this intermediary test
might be described as the "fair and substantial" relation test; it requires the
discrimination to bear a fair and substantial relation to the statutory
objective. 160
After carefully reviewing cases applying the three tests, the court in
White summarized ambiguously: "[Wihatever formulation the [Supreme]
Court may ultimately adopt, it can at least be divined. . . that we may not
accept a classification based solely on sex without further inquiry as to
whether the differences between men and women rationally justify the
classification." 161
If this language seemed to suggest adherence to the traditional rational
basis test, the court's subsequent analysis suggested some sort of inter-
mediary test. Under the rational basis test, "a classification must be sustained
'if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' "162
However, in evaluating the Milwaukee bar ordinance, the court refrained
from the kind of imaginative speculation too often stimulated by this doctrine.
Assumptions that prostitutes tend to be women and to frequent bars, asserted
the court, "do not in logic or experience support broader assumptions about
all or most women who work in bars or the relative proclivities of men and
women, ... . " 163 The equal protection clause does not tolerate "stereotyped
assumptions concerning propensities thought to exist in some members of a
given sex." 164 The court concluded, "This is not necessarily to say that sex is
159. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,682 (1973) (Brennan, Douglas, White, Marshall,
J.J.) (plurality opinion).
160. The tests are discussed id. at 733-36, and the "fair and substantial" relation test at
734-35 & 735 n.6. See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566-68
(majority), 2568-73 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
161. 522 F.2d at 736.
162. Id. at 734. While acknowledging some cases in which the United States Supreme Court
was less willing than it formerly had been to ascribe legitimate purposes to the legislative body,
the court viewed the "reasonably conceivable" language as "reaffirmed" by Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
163. 522 F.2d at 737.
164. Id.
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an inherently suspect classification, a point which the Supreme Court has yet
to decide." 165
Only two months later, however, in another opinion written by Judge
Tone, the court seemed to be taken in by the very kind of "stereotyped
assumptions" it rejected in White. In Mims v. Board of Education,166 five
female and six male employees in the job category "Film Serviceman I" were
laid off. The six men, but not the women, were kept on temporarily for doing
"heavy work of moving equipment. ",167 The women filed suit charging sex
discrimination. The district court found that these facts did not demonstrate
sex discrimination and the court of appeals upheld the finding as not clearly
erroneous. The defendant, explained the court, "determined to retain the six
males because he considered the temporary males able to do the heavy lifting
and moving that the female civil servants would be unable to do. It is
reasonable to take into account the individual's physical capabilities in
determining who can perform a certain kind of work."1 68
Yet that is precisely the point. The women were entitled to be judged on
their individual physical capabilities relative to those of the men and not to be
excluded on the basis of a stereotyped assumption about the frailty of their
sex. Indeed, in also holding that the women had been denied due process for
lack of a hearing before their layoffs, the court tacitly admitted that the frailty
might lie in the stereotype, not in the women. "Plaintiffs at least were entitled
to an opportunity to attempt to demonstrate that they were capable of
performing the work assigned to the six temporary employees." 169
If the ruling on the merits in Mims is less enlightened than in White, the
ruling on the remedy in Mims is even more difficult to understand. Having
determined that plaintiffs were denied due process, the court held defendants
immune from damages on the ground that they had acted in good faith and not
unreasonably. 170 But it then proceeded to deny plaintiffs any remedy what-
soever. It explained only that "[f]ive years after the action complained of is
too late to order injunctive relief," to reinstate plaintiffs or to offer them
another position. 171 Yet the five years had passed almost entirely because the
district court had twice ruled incorrectly on the merits, and had twice been
overruled by the court of appeals. On this second appeal, however, the district
165. Id. at 737. But see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2569
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. 523 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1975).
167. Id. at 713, 714.
168. Id. at 715.
169. Id.
170. The court also held that the Board was not subject to the court's jurisdiction because it
was not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and plaintiffs had not pleaded alternative jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 523 F.2d at 716.
171. 523 F.2d at 715.
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court's erroneous ruling was technically affirmed, "[s]ince plaintiffs are not
entitled to relief." 72 Plaintiffs, after five years of apparently diligent pros-
ecution of their lawsuit, had a right without a remedy.
The apparent injustice in Mims contrasts with a more favorable result
obtained to date by plaintiff in Evans v. United Air Lines, Inc.,173 one of the
more important Title VII cases decided this term and presently pending before
the United State Supreme Court. Two issues were presented in Evans, albeit
obscurely. One was substantive, having to do with whether a seniority system
which perpetuates the effects of past discrimination is itself an independent
violation of Title VII. The other was jurisdictional, having to do with when
the statutory 180-day limitations period under Title VII begins to run in a case
challenging such a seniority system. 174
Plaintiff Evans had "involuntarily resigned" as a United stewardess in
February 1968, because of a company policy which disqualified women who
married from continuing as stewardesses. 175 In November 1968, United
discontinued this policy, which was ruled unlawfully discriminatory in
1971 .176 In February of 1972 Evans was rehired without the seniority she had
accrued through 1968. A year later she filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission 177 charging that this denial of senior-
ity constituted sex discrimination.
The district court rejected plaintiff Evans' argument that the 1972 denial
of seniority, by perpetuating the effects of past discrimination, was a "current
and continuing" violation of Title VII. 178 The court of appeals initially
agreed, but on rehearing reversed and remanded. 179 The substantive issue was
prima facie simple. The Supreme Court had previously ruled that under Title
VII, "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo
of prior discriminatory employment practices." 18 0 United's policy of denying
accrued seniority to persons rehired after a prior termination, when applied to
persons like Evans whose termination had been caused by a discriminatory
employment practice, unlawfully operated to "freeze in" the effects of the
prior discrimination. 181 Consequently the 180-day limitations period was no
172. Id. at 713, 716.
173. 534 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 308 (1976) (Evans is also discussed at
pages 520-40 infra). See also Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F. 2d 718 (4th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1976) (No. 76-838).
174. See 534 F.2d at 1248, 1250.
175. Id. at 1247-48.
176. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
177. Hereinafter referred to as EEOC.
178. 534 F.2d at 1248.
179. Id.
180. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430(1971), quoted in 534 F.2d at 1250 n. 15.
181. 534 F.2d at 1250.
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bar to suit, because plaintiff Evans clearly filed her EEOC charge within 180
days of the "current and continuing" discriminatory denial of her accrued
seniority. 182
United's defense on the merits lay in an exception to Title VII which
allows an employer to treat employees differently "pursuant to a bona fide
seniority . . . system." 183 However, Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co. ,184 decided by the United States Supreme Court while the petition for
rehearing in Evans was pending, seems to answer this defense. The Supreme
Court held that this exception to Title VII protects the operation of a seniority
system only when challenged as perpetuating effects of discrimination
occurring "prior to the effective date of the Act." ' 185 Since Title VII was
effective in 1965 and the original discrimination against plaintiff Evans did
not occur until 1968, Franks clearly indicates that the "bona fide seniority
system" exception could not be invoked against Evans. The court of appeals
properly so held, after rehearing the case in light of Franks.186
Apart from the bona fide seniority system defense, defendant United
argued with superficial plausibility that "if a discriminatory act is considered
to continue for so long as there is some lingering effect, every alleged
discriminatory act could be litigated at any time. A discrimination, ...
would never be final, despite the limitation period . . , since there might
always be some lingering effects-monetary or otherwise." 8 7 The court's
opinion does not make clear whether United urged this as a defense on the
merits against an expansive interpretation of "unlawful employment prac-
tices" under Title VII, or as an argument on the proper interpretation of the
statutory limitations period, or in some other way. Certainly the argument
cannot prevail as a defense on the merits. Cases striking down practices which
"freeze in" effects of past discrimination have long since passed it by. 188 Nor
182. See id. at 1251.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974); see 534 F.2d at 1249.
184. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
185. Id. at 761.
186. 534 F.2d at 1250-51. In so holding, the court of appeals labored valiantly to distinguish
the facts of Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1316-20 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 2214 (1976). The facts may indeed be technically distinguishable, but clearly much of the
thrust of Waters' reasoning on the seniority issue has been dissipated by Evans.
187. These are the words of the court, not of United. 534 F.2d at 1249.
188. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and cases cited in Evans, 534
F.2d at 1250 n. 15. These cases demonstrate that International Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411
(1960), is not dispositive of Evans. In Machinists, the Court rejected under the National Labor
Relations Act a limitations argument parallel to that made under Title VII by plaintiff Evans.
However, the limitations provision there was construed strictly because of the purposes of the
statute in which it appeared, which were "overall" to promote industrial peace, including
"stability of bargaining relationships." Id. at 428, 425. The complainant's interest, "employee
freedom of choice," was important but secondary, see id. at 428, and Congress manifested a
specific intention not to disturb collective bargaining agreements more than six months after their
inception, however unlawful. Id. at 426-27. The dual purposes of Title VII , in contrast, are to
eradicate discrimination and to make victims whole so far as possible. Franks v. Bowman
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can it prevail in interpreting the statutory limitations period. If the offense is
indeed current and continuing, United's argument would have the limitations
period end before the offense is committed.
The argument deserves a hearing, if at all, on the remedy. 8 9 If a Title VII
plaintiff inexcusably waits too long, either she should be denied relief
altogether or her relief should be curtailed, such as by denying all credit for
accrued seniority.
But plaintiff Evans did not wait too long. The offense here-refusal to
grant her accrued seniority--did not and could not commence until she was
rehired in February of 1972. She is not seeking damages for her involuntary
termination in 1968. True, after being rehired she waited a year before filing
charges with the EEOC. But given the novelty of her claim and the fact that
she, like most Title VII claimants, is not a lawyer, one year is hardly an
unconscionable period, particularly on a claim of continuing wrong. 190 Just as
Title VII plaintiffs are not held to professional pleading standards, 191 so they
ought not be held to the standards of expedition demanded of corporate
employers advised by specialized counsel on permanent retainers.
United thus presented a good argument in theory but not on these facts.
The result reached by the court of appeals deserves to be affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
The non-technical reception which Title VII plaintiffs deserve was
underscored by the court of appeals sitting en banc in Jenkins v. Blue Cross
Mutual Hospital Insurance. 192 On her EEOC complaint form, plaintiff had
indicated the nature of her claim by checking the box for race discrimination,
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976)..These purposes counsel a more flexible reading of
the limitations period under Title VII. Moreover, the "freeze-in" cases have regularly brought
seniority relations originating more than six months prior to the filing of a discrimination charge
within reach of judicial redress under Title VII.
189. Both retroactive seniority and backpay can be denied, and presumably limited, in
particular cases "for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination." Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
771 (1976) (retroactive seniority); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975)
(backpay). It seems fair to extend this principle to the "accrued seniority" remedy sought by
plaintiff Evans, as well as to the backpay she seeks. 534 F.2d at 1247.
The equitable defense of laches is apparently not available to defendant United, even though
plaintiff Evans seeks equitable relief, because of the congressional specification of a statutory
limitations period. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). Nonetheless, laches
principles might be considered by analogy on the remedy issue. See also Pasadena Bd. of Educ.
v. Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 2697, 2704-05 (1976).
190. Cf. Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 220-21 (N.D. 11. 1969)
(action not barred by statute of limitations with respect to sales contracts which had not
terminated before the running of the statute; purpose served by such statutes is to ensure that
stale claims are not decided), aff'd sub nor. Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 420 F.2d 1191, 1200(7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
191. This is reflected in the case discussed next, Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., 538
F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 506 (1977).
192. 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 506 (1977).
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but not the box for sex discrimination. Her narrative complaint explained that
she had experienced no problem until she began wearing an Afro hair style.
She was then accused of being "the leader of the girls." The complaint
asserted that she was forced either to transfer to another job or to terminate her
employment, and that a white friend "might have been denied her promotion
because of her association with me. ' 1 93
The court held these claims before the EEOC sufficient to qualify
plaintiff to file a subsequent class action on behalf of "all black and female
persons who are employed, or might be employed, by Blue Cross-Blue
Shield, Inc.," 194 and, the court implied, to " 'launch a full scale inquiry' "
into employment discrimination on the basis of race and sex at Blue
Cross-Blue Shield. 195 The controlling standard, all members of the court
agreed, was that a Title VII suit could " 'properly encompass any . . .
discrimination like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge
[before the EEOC] and growing out of such allegations.' "'19 Three judges,
however, including the two who had formed the majority on the earlier,
contrary panel decision, dissented on the application of the standard to the
facts.
In the course of its opinion the court reaffirmed that "Title VII is to 'be
construed and applied broadly,' "197 and expressly adopted a policy already
recognized elsewhere "of being 'solicitous of the Title VII plaintiff.' "198 In
any event, the full court agreed that wholly apart from Title VII, plaintiff's
EEOC complaint could not limit her eligibility to represent a class on her race
discrimination complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.199
In addition to Evans and Jenkins, the court ruled for plaintiffs in a
number of other cases raising procedural issues under Title VII. In Adams v.
Brinegar,200 the court ruled that the 1972 amendment subjecting federal
government employers to Title VII applied retroactively to cases pending
administratively on its effective date. 20 1 In McGuire v. ALCOA ,202 the court
193. Id. at 167.
194. Id. at 169.
195. Id. at 168.
196. Id. at 167 (quoting Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 162(5th Cir. 1971)).
197. Id. at 167 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339, 1344 (7th Cir. 1973)).
198. 538 F.2d at 168 (citing, inter alia, Gamble v. Birmingham R.R., 514 F.2d 678,687-89(5th
Cir. 1975)).
199. 538 F.2d at 166. However, the court remanded for consideration of the plaintiff's
eligibility to serve as class representative in light of a factual question as to whether her
employment terminated voluntarily, and also a question of possible mootness. Id. at 169. Earlier
the court had also noted a question concerning the appealability of the district court's denial of
class certification, which apparently did not matter since plaintiff had also appealed a denial of a
preliminary injunction. Id. at 166 n.2.
200. 521 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1975).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
202. 542 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1976).
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held that the ninety-day period for filing suit under Title VII begins to run on
the date the plaintiff receives a "right-to-sue" letter from the EEOC, not on
the earlier date when notice is received from the EEOC that the letter may be
requested. 203 In Romasanta v. United Air Lines, Inc., 204 the court permitted a
member of a class which the district court had declined to certify to intervene
in the named plaintiffs' Title VII action, four years after it was filed but only
three weeks after the final order and four days after the would-be class
member learned for certain that the denial of class certification was not being
appealed. In Caro v. Schultz,205 the court correctly anticipated the Supreme
Court's subsequent ruling in Chandler v. Roudebush2°6 that federal employ-
ees are entitled to a trial de novo in Title VII suits, even if the record of the
administrative hearing clearly fails to establish a finding of discrimination.
Finally, in Denofre v. Transportation Insurance Rating Bureau ,207 after a
district court ruled against a Title VII plaintiff without making all the specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law required by rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court of appeals remanded for the necessary
findings and conclusions to be made. 20 8 Judge Swygert, however, dissented
on the ground that nothing less than a new trial would do. 2°9 The portion of the
record below quoted in his dissent reveals that the court of appeals' liberal
attitude toward Title VII actions is not necessarily reflected in the trial courts.
The trial judge had voiced the following opinion just before granting
defendant's motion to dismiss without argument.
These days, everytime a woman or a black or a Latino or an elderly
person or a young person loses his job, it is a violation these days
that their civil rights have been violated, and they flood the federal
court not only here but throughout the country and this is a new way
of trying to retain your job, regardless of why they are released.21'
Transient frustration, perhaps, produced these remarks. Nonetheless, it is
difficult to understand why any plaintiff should be remanded to a trial judge
who has expressed such blatant bias.
Two contrasting decisions, one granting and one denying a preliminary
injunction, offer useful lessons for Title VII practitioners in challenges to
system-wide employment discrimination in government agencies. 211 In
203. Id. at 45; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
204. 537 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonald, 45 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1976) (No. 76-545).
205. 521 F.2d 1084(7th Cir. 1975), cert. deniedsub nom. Caro v. Simon, 426 U.S. 919(1976).
206. 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
207. 532 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1976).
208. Id. at 45.
209. Id. at 45-46.
210. Id. at 46.
211. In a third Title VII public employment case, the court declined to rule on an appeal from
a preliminary injunction, pending a possible appeal from the permanent injunction which had
already been issued by the district court. United States v. City of Chicago, 534 F.2d 708 (7th Cir.
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Crockett v. Green,212 the district court granted a preliminary injunction
against racial discrimination in employment of skilled craft workers by
members of the Milwaukee Board of City Service Commissioners. The order
enjoined defendants from demanding apprenticeship and experience as pre-
requisites for some positions. Defendants were ordered to hire one black per-
son for every two openings in each skilled craft job classification until the
percentage of blacks in that classification equalled the percentage of blacks in
Milwaukee. 213
The court of appeals held that the ratio hiring, "for a limited period as
part of a broad equitable remedy," was within the district court's discre-
tion.214 Without explanation, the court also held that the district court's choice
of the percentage of blacks in Milwaukee (seventeen percent) as a target ratio,
rather than the "considerably lower" percentage of blacks in the metropolitan
area, was within its discretion. 215 Finally, the court rejected defendants'
contention that the ratios should not immediately apply to upper-level
positions which required extensive training and to which whites already in
entry-level jobs legitimately expected to be promoted. The court noted that
the order did not require employment of "nonqualified employees". 216
Finally, the court cautioned that it was not reviewing a permanent
injunction. One could not confidently predict how the ratio hiring system
would work, and the district court might in the future modify its order as
needed.217
Instead of seeking affirmative relief specifying the racial composition of
new recruits, as in Crockett, plaintiffs in Washington v. Walker 218 sought
temporarily to bar the Illinois State Police from hiring any new troopers. 219
The district court refused to grant such a preliminary injunction, and the court
of appeals affirmed, mainly because "the harm to the public from unfilled
state police positions out-weighed the injury to the plaintiffs.' 220 In addition,
1976). The court later ruled on the permanent injunction, but the ruling was too recent for
inclusion in this review. United States v. City of Chicago, Nos. 76-1113, 1152, 1205 and 1344 (7th
Cir. Jan. 11, 1977), aff'g in part, rev'g in part and remanding forfurtherproceedings 411 F. Supp.
218 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
212. 534 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1976). In addition to the rulings discussed in the text, the court
upheld the certification of a class of all blacks capable of working in or being trained for skilled
craft jobs and who have been or will be denied such jobs because of their race, and the
designation of the sole named plaintiff, a trained bricklayer, to represent it. The court declared,
"Class action status is particularly appropriate in a case involving class discrimination." Id. at
718.
213. Id. at 717.
214. Id. at 718.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 719.
217. Id.
218. 529 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976).
219. Id. at 1064.
220. Id. at 1065.
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defendants had already begun a program of ratio hiring as a result of
negotiations with the EEOC, and had more than fulfilled their first year's
goals. 22'
Two other cases decided this term illustrate the difficulties faced by
victims of employment discrimination in the absence of a clearcut statutory
remedy. Plaintiff in Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology222 had the
misfortune to suffer alleged sex discrimination before the effective date either
of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act 223 or of Title VII's coverage of
educational institutions, 224 "although the victim of comparable discrimina-
tion occurring today would clearly have a remedy under either of those
statutes.' 225 She was therefore forced to rely on the alternative theories that
the officials of the private university had acted under color of state law so as to
bring the discrimination within 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or that they had conspired
to deprive her of federally protected rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).226
Neither theory succeeded. Although Illinois Institute of Technology
received some financial support from the state, the court of appeals held that it
was "not so heavily dependent on the State as to be considered the equivalent
of a public university for all purposes and in all its activities." 227 Elsewhere,
action by private universities receiving "substantial financial support" has
been regarded as tantamount to state action, but I.I.T. received "only a small
fraction" of its revenue from the state. Even so, that would have been enough
"to require a finding of state action if that support ha[d] furthered the specific
policies or conduct under attack." 228 But here it had not.
For the same reason, plaintiff's section 1985(3) claim failed. Unlike
victims of racial discrimination, she had no federally protected rights to equal
treatment in the purely private sector under the thirteenth amendment, and the
fourteenth amendment forbids arbitrary sex discrimination only by states. 229
Thus, even assuming that defendants conspired to discriminate against her,
they did not conspire to deprive her of any federal rights under either
221. Id. at 1064, 1065.
222. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
223. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 853(a) (1975) (effective Aug. 27, 1971).
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (effective Mar. 24, 1972).
225. 524 F.2d at 822.
226. Id. at 821. Plaintiff asserted five "state action" theories: (1) I.I.T.'s name gave an
appearance of state action; (2) state financial and other aid; (3) pervasive state regulation; (4) the
state's failure to take affirmative action to prevent sex discrimination by I.I.T.; and (5) I.I.T.'s
'public function." Id. at 823-24 & 826 n.24. Only the second and third theories were seriously
considered by the court, which rejected both for the reasons stated in text accompanying notes
227-30 infra.
227. Id. at 825.
228. Id. at 825-26, 825 n.18.
229. Id. at 828-29; see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Dombrowski v. Dowling,
459 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1972).
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amendment. Therefore, no cause of action was stated under section
1985(3).230
Cohen must be read with care. It does not mean that discrimination by a
private university is not state action. Nor does it hold that section 1985(3)
does not cover a private conspiracy to discriminate on the basis of sex.
Resolution of both issues in Cohen depended on examination of the facts; in
another case the result may differ.
Another victim of both alleged employment discrimination and the
absence of an applicable remedial statute was the plaintiff in Gault v.
Garrison. 231 Forced to retire as a public school teacher at the age of
sixty-five, she claimed that the admitted age discrimination denied her due
process and equal protection of the laws. 232 In the face of two summary
affirmances by the Supreme Court of decisions rejecting similar claims, 233 the
court of appeals opted to stay plaintiff's appeal pending the Supreme Court's
ruling in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia I234 n June of 1976,
the Supreme Court in Murgia held that a Massachusetts statute forcing state
police officers to retire at the age of fifty was justified on a rational basis and
accordingly did not violate the equal protection clause . 23 5 While still possible,
successful challenges to mandatory retirement statutes on federal constitu-
tional grounds will be difficult for the foreseeable future. 236
230. 524 F.2d at 829. Plaintiff Cohen did not allege a private conspiracy to violate her right of
interstate travel, as had plaintiffs in Griffin, 403 U.S. at 88, nor did she allege a private conspiracy
to violate her first amendment rights. The court left open the possibility that section 1985(3) might
cover such a conspiracy, noting authority on both sides of the issue. 524 F.2d at 829 n.33.
231. 523 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1975).
232. Id. at 205.
233. Id. at 205-06; Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975); Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415
U.S. 986 (1974). The court's opinion carefully reviewed the question of the precedential force of
United States Supreme Court summary affirmances, concluding that in this case they were "at
least extremely persuasive precedents if not binding ones." 523 F.2d at 209.
234. 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
235. Id. at 2568.
236. In Murgia, the Court concluded: "We decide only that the system enacted by the
Massachusetts Legislature does not deny appellee equal protection of the law." 96 S. Ct. at 2568.
In context, the Court meant by this merely to disclaim passing on the wisdom of the statute, not to
signal clearly that it might invalidate different mandatory retirement statutes. Nonetheless, the
discrimination in Murgia may be distinguishable from other, less defensible age discrimination.
The decision stressed the " 'general relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical
ability to respond to the demands of the [state police officer's] job.' " Id. at 2565 (citation
omitted). Other jobs, such as judicial positions, might not show such rational correlation between
age and qualification. See id. at 2573 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In addition, the due process question of an irrebuttable presumption raised in Gault was not
explicitly decided in Murgia. See id. at 2564, 2565. However, it was raised in the briefs. The Court
apparently chose simply to ignore the issue. The result in Murgia, therefore, necessarily rejects
the irrebuttable presumption argument, which was already floundering in the wake of Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). See also the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), which protects employees who are at least forty but less than
sixty-five from discharge on grounds of age, except "where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 29 U.S.C.
§§ 623(f)(1), 631 (1976).
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FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
In three cases this term, the court of appeals seemed keenly appreciative
of the nature and importance of first amendment freedoms. However, it
resolved free speech issues only after careful consideration of facts relevant to
what it regarded as countervailing interests, of the means used to promote
those interests, and of their impact on first amendment interests.
The court's decision in Hanneman v. Breier237 may foreshadow its
eventual response to post-Watergate government security litigation now
wending through trial courts. 237.1 In Hanneman, the court held that an
administrative rule making all "official business" of the Milwaukee police
department "confidential" was unconstitutional as applied.238 Relying on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion239 and on one of its own prior decisions, 240 the court of appeals
emphatically adopted a case-by-case, interest-balancing approach, at least in
cases involving first amendment rights of public employees.
Several police union members had written relevant city and state
officials confirming the existence of an internal departmental investigation.
While invalidating administrative sanctions imposed on these officers for
breach of the confidentiality rule, the court provisionally declined to enjoin
further application of the rule. In dicta, it characterized the confidentiality
rule as "clearly valid on its face.' ,241 "To justify application of the confiden-
tiality rule in this case," the court held that the defendant police chief "must
show a state interest in confidentiality applicable on these facts which
outweighs the public and individual interests in the particular statements
made. " 24 2
Analyzing the state's interest, the court conceded that a public employer,
in a general sense, "has a legitimate interest in preserving confidentiality in
the conduct of its internal affairs," particularly "in the sensitive area of law
enforcement. "243 In this case, however, before the officers wrote their letters,
237. 528 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976).
237.1 Broadly viewed, Hanneman involved the clash of first amendment interests with
governmental security interests. In this sense, the court's ruling addressed the same broad issues
currently at stake in litigation over alleged infiltration and surveillance of community groups by
the Chicago police department, the Army, the FBI and others. See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers'
Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Chicago, No. 76 C 1982 (N.D. Ill., filed May 28, 1976);
ACLU v. Chicago, No. 75 C 3295 (N.D. Ill., filed Oct. 3, 1975); Alliance To End Repression v.
Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. I11. 1975).
The specific first amendment issues, of course, are quite different in the surveillance cases,
which also raise major fourth and fifth amendment issues not involved in Hanneman.
238., 528 F.2d at 756.
239. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); 528 F.2d at 753. See also Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 45 U.S.L.W. 4043 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1976) (No. 75-946).
240. Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973).
241. 528 F.2d at 754, 756.
242. Id. at 754.
243. Id.
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the privacy of the investigation had been "destroyed" in a front-page
newspaper article quoting an acknowledgment of the investigation by the
police chief himself. Moreover, noted the court, the officers involved were
not "in such a close personal relationship" with the police chief "that sharp
public criticism could not be tolerated.' ,244 In addition, the chief was free in
this instance to defend himself publicly.
The court then considered the officers' first amendment interests. Police
officers, unlike members of the military services, " 'are not relegated to a
watered-down version of constitutional rights.' "245 Although their freedom
to speak concerning their employment "may be more or less limited,' 246 the
officers' letter here was worthy of protection. It accused the department's
highest official, the police chief, of "improper," anti-union motives in
ordering an investigation of union-related political activities by the offi-
cers. 247 The officers had no practical alternative but to go outside the
department with an appeal to responsible officials for protection. Even though
the district court found that the investigation was not improperly motivated,
the officers' letter still merited protection because it was written in good faith.
The state's interest in preventing publication of false criticism, ruled the court
of appeals, could override its employees' interests in free speech only if their
statements were knowingly or recklessly false. 248
Without indicating whether the officers' interests in free speech alone
would also outweigh the state's separate and additional interest in confiden-
tiality, the court went on to consider the "public's interest in being in-
formed." 249 At the core of the first amendment, it said, "is a preference for
debate rather than suppression." 250 The officers' letter "touched on matters
of public concern' '-public employment and collective bargaining by public
employees-for which its recipients were officially responsible. 251 In sum,
considering "all the factors," the court concluded that the "need to enforce
the confidentiality rule against the statements here in issue" was outweighed
by "the individual and public interests in their expression.' '252 It then
remanded for consideration of the appropriate remedy.
In three other first amendment cases this term, the court's decisions were
more circumscribed by precedent. In Aikens v. Jenkins253 the court, in
244. Id. at 755.
245. Id. at 754 (quoting Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967)).
246. 528 F.2d at 754.
247. Id. at 755.
248. Id. For the standard of knowing or reckless falsehood, the court analogized from New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
249. 528 F.2d at 755, 756.
250. Id. at 755.
251. Id. at 755-56.
252. Id. at 756.
253. 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976).
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striking down prison censorship regulations for overbreadth, tracked the
reasoning of the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Procunier v. Martinez.254
Procunier held that prisoners' first amendment rights "must be 'applied in
light of the special characteristics of the . . . environment.' "255 Prison
censorship regulations can be justified only if they further "one or more of the
substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation," if
their restrictive impact on first amendment freedoms is "no greater than is
necessary or essential" to protect those interests, and if prison officials carry
their burden of proving both of these conditions. 256
In addition to Procunier, the court of appeals premised its analysis on
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,257 in which the Supreme Court had held that a
statute "should not be deemed facially invalid unless [1] it is not readily
subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts . . and [2] its
deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial. '258 In
theory, said Judge Tone for the court, the same test would "normally" apply
to administrative regulations, but here the court could not ignore that local
prison officials had banned "inter alia, Dostoevski's The Gambler, Gibran's
The Prophet, and all publications of Bantam Books." 259
Following Procunier and Erznoznik, the court invalidated three regula-
tions. One appeared to prohibit photos or paintings of nudes unless "suppor-
tive or incidental to a theme not designed primarily to arouse sexual
desires.'" 26 This, reasoned the court, might exclude "a collection of works of
art" conveying no theme, innocent or otherwise. 261 Another regulation
prohibited literature that encouraged "aggressive hostility toward prison
authorities" or toward minority groups, "or having a substantially inflam-
matory effect on inmates," including material "in any way subversive of
institutional discipline." ,262 This one bore more than a passing resemblance to
a regulation invalidated in Procunier and, as in that case, invited prison
officials " 'to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as stand-
ards.' "263 The last regulation prohibited literature "glorifying criminals,
discussing the modus operandi of a felon, or treating in a bizarre fashion the
details or circumstances of a crime." 264 The court struck it down in part
254. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
255. Id. at 409-10.
256. Id. at 413.
257. 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
258. Id.
259. 534 F.2d at 754.
260. Id. at 756.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974)).
264. Id. at 757.
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because, "[aIpplied literally, it would exclude many of the world's great
books.'" 265
Freedom from censorship need not mean unbridled license. In Carson v.
Allied News Co. ,266 the court reversed a summary judgment for a defendant
tabloid in a libel suit brought by Joanna Holland and her husband, television
personality Johnny Carson, because of an article defaming their sex life.
Applying the familiar if imprecise New York Times rule,267 the court
predictably found Mr. Carson to be "an all-purpose public figure."
' 268
Unfortunately, in also characterizing Ms. Holland as a public figure, the court
ventured that "one can assume that the wife of a public figure such as Carson
more or less automatically becomes at least a part-time public figure
herself.' ,269
The court then examined whether the facts could support the finding of
"actual malice" required to sustain libel actions brought by public figures.
Relying on two factors-" completely fabricated" accusations, and "wholly
imagined but supposedly precisely quoted conversations' '-the court found
enough to entitle the plaintiff couple to a jury trial. 270 Defendants' professed
absence of malice toward plaintiffs was immaterial, since what counted was
their "attitude toward the truth or falsity" of their statements, and defendants
had "a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity."
271
In the third case, Grandco Corp. v. Rochford,272 the court had no trouble
invalidating a Chicago ordinance requiring an operating license for a public
place of amusement, as it applied to movie theaters. 273 The ordinance
provided that the mayor "may" issue a license upon a "satisfactory"
showing that the applicant is a "fit and proper" person. Such terms patently
failed to provide the "narrow, objective and definite standards" required to
license exercise of first amendment freedoms by such Supreme Court
decisions as Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham. 274
The difficulty was in reaching the merits. Two of three plaintiffs did not.
They had no licenses and were apparently being repeatedly prosecuted for
265. Id. at 756-57.
266. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
267. The rule originated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1974).
268. 529 F.2d at 210.
269. Id. Whether similar status is accorded husbands of public figures, or spouses of judges,
were questions not presented.
270. Id. at 213. The court also considered a third factor, the reporter's failure to verify a
crucial factual assertion in his article, which he simply lifted from another newspaper's article.
But the court ruled that it need not decide whether this showed actual malice because of the
presence of the other two factors. Id. at 211.
271. Id. at 213, 214.
272. 536 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1976).
273. Id. at 207-08.
274. Id. at 207; 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
failure to have one. Under Younger v. Harris,275 the federal court could not
enjoin good faith, pending prosecutions under the city ordinance.27 6 Mere
multiple prosecutions did not demonstrate bad faith, ruled the Court. Even the
"existence of adverse state appellate court authority" on their federal
constitutional claims did not entitle plaintiffs to avoid relegation to state
remedies, since the state courts might "change their minds. '277
The one plaintiff who survived Younger faced no pending criminal
prosecution. That plaintiff did face pending city administrative proceedings
to revoke theater operating licenses. However, said the court, comity under
Younger mandated federal restraint "only upon an express finding that the
state's interest in its own [administrative] proceedings is substantial and that
those proceedings provide a proper forum for vindication of the federal
plaintiffs' constitutional claim.''278 Chicago's administrative proceedings
were not such a forum for this plaintiff.
Declaratory relief "at a minimum" was therefore permissible and the
court affirmed the declaratory judgment entered below on behalf of this
plaintiff. However, since such relief was "sufficient in itself" in this case,
and a permanent injunction might involve additional "considerations of
comity and federalism" upon which the Supreme Court had yet to pass, the
court of appeals remanded with directions to vacate the permanent injunction
which had been awarded. 279
The practical effect of Younger and its aftermath, as cautiously con-
strued in Grandco, is to tone down the free speech guarantee of the fourteenth
amendment to no more than an uncertain echo of the first amendment. In
federal court, the fourteenth, while retaining the full substantive content of
the first amendment, lacks its remedial force. State or local restriction of free
speech by criminal laws is all too often shielded by comity from federal suit.
Restriction by administrative regulation is sometimes equally beyond federal
redress, 280 and in other situations subject only to minimal redress.
The court in Grandco might at least have affirmed the permanent
injunction against future enforcement of the ordinance with respect to
enforcement against movie theaters. 28 1 Perhaps the court presumed that the
275. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
276. 536 F.2d 201-07. It was not clear whether there were in fact prosecutions pending
against one of these two plaintiffs when the federal suit was filed, but the court concluded that the
pendency of such proceedings could "fairly be inferred" from the complaint. Id. at 205.
277. Id. at 206-07.
278. Id. at 208.
279. Id.
280. This is in the situation where the regulations afford a "proper forum" for presentation
of federal constitutional claims and the state has a "substantial" interest in the administrative
procedures thus established. Id. at 206, 208.
281. The district court had enjoined "all further and future enforcement" of the ordinance;
the court of appeals enjoined none. Id. at 208.
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declaratory judgment would automatically stimulate a proper revision of the
ordinance and, if not, that the next applicant improperly denied a permit could
readily obtain an injunction, since the city's failure to heed the declaratory
judgment would then sufficiently demonstrate bad faith. But what of permit
applicants unaware of the court's ruling or not advised by counsel? Until an
injunction finally issues, a mere declaratory judgment gives no assurance that
their constitutional rights will not be violated by an ordinance already ruled
facially unconstitutional. A declaratory judgment may protect the next
litigant, but it does not necessarily protect the next persons to bear the brunt of
the unconstitutional ordinance, unless they also have the awareness, determi-
nation, and financial wherewithal to take their grievances to court. First
amendment freedoms, as embodied in the-fourteenth amendment, deserve
more protection than this. 282
In state courts, the fourteenth amendment is theoretically preserved
intact, both substantively and remedially. But as demonstrated by the history
of federal court redemption of free speech from abridgements tolerated by
state courts, 283 these tribunals are often inadequate guardians of federal
rights. In some times and places, their inadequacy is notorious. The 1871
Civil Rights Act (under which plaintiffs in Grandco sued) was enacted
largely because Congress recognized as much. 2 4 Federal courts ought not, as
Grandco does, shortchange the first amendment in the name of respect for
federalism and states' rights. Rights of citizens are usually more easily
infringed-and less easily protected-than rights of governments.
282. It might be suggested that the city would necessarily modify its ordinance to conform
with the United States Constitution. But there is no guarantee that the city would modify it at all,
much less that it would do so promptly and in full accord with proper constitutional standards.
It might also be urged that movie theater owners all have counsel who are quite familiar with
decisions, like Grandco, which specially affect the industry. There may be much truth to that, but
the court should not assume it in the absence of some evidentiary showing. Moreover, the
wait-and-see remedial approach of Grandco would be especially harsh in cases where the
litigants are not likely to have counsel or counsel with specialized knowledge.
283. Recent decisions in those areas of federal judicial oversight of free expression not
curtailed by Younger are only the latest in an endless line of decisions in which federal courts
have had to strike down laws or actions earlier upheld by state courts. E.g., Nebraska Press
Ass'n. v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791,2796-97 (1976); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,620-23
(1976); cf. Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 45 U.S.L.W.
4043 (U.S. Dec. 8, 1976) (No. 75-946) (order which prohibited non-union teachers from speaking
at public meeting about pending labor negotiations struck down as improper prior restraint on
teachers' expressions to board of education on school matters). More egregious examples are not
hard to find. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
284. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
